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PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION ACTIONS FILED IN FEDERAL
COURT: NONSUBSTANTIVE MATTERS AFFECTING
LIABILITY AND RELIEF
Gary J. Spahn*
David E. Boone**
I. INTRODUCTION
Confusion regarding who may be held liable and what relief may
be sought is evident in the inconsistent and conflicting decisions of
the federal courts in private actions which charge unlawful discrimi-
nation under color of state law. The cause of the confusion has little
to do with whether in fact the plaintiff has been the victim of dis-
crimination but may be attributed to the piecemeal development of
what may be termed nonsubstantive matters which nevertheless
substantially affect the issues of liability and relief.
The original and ultimate sources of authority for such discrimi-
nation suits are the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments which
were ratified in 1865 and 1868, respectively.' Pursuant to section 2
of the thirteenth amendment and section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
* B. A., Long Island University, 1971; M. A., Long Island University, 1976; J. D., Univer-
sity of Richmond, 1975; Law Clerk to Judge D. Dortch Warriner, U. S. District Court for the
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1. SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
SEcION 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XHI.
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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ment, Congress, from time to time, has enacted legislation designed
to enforce the rights these amendments protect.2 A study of the
legislative history3 of the applicable statutes persuasively implies
that Congress did not enforce these amendments comprehensively
nor has the intermittent interpretation of these statutes by the fed-
eral courts manifested a discernable pattern or principle of enforce-
ment.
With few exceptions, these statutes are limited in application to
a particular kind of discriminatory conduct4 and there is considera-
ble overlap in the protections they afford.' Indeed, even where the
2. The passage of this legislation spans over a hundred years. The most important of the
acts from the standpoints of scope, substantive protection and creation of a private right of
action with provisions for remedies are summarized below under their statutory codifications:
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) is based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and ensures racial
equality under the law;
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) is based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and protects against
racial discrimination in the sale or lease of property;
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) is based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and protects against
constitutional deprivations of rights, privileges and immunities under color of state law;
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970) is based upon the Civil Rights Acts of 1861 and 1871 and guards
against conspiracies to deny equal protection of the laws;
42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1970) is based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and creates a cause of
action for willfull or negligent failure to prevent a conspiracy actionable under § 1985;
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) is based upon the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1870 and authorizes district courts, where they deem it necessary to furnish suitable remedies,
to apply the common law and statutory law of the state where the court sits to supplement
the relief otherwise available in §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 actions;
42 U.S.C. 98 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970) are based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and pro-
tect against discrimination in places of public accommodation, in places wherein operations
affect commerce and in places supported by state action;
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) are also based upon the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and safeguards against discrimination in employment;
42 U.S.C. 99 3601 to 3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) are based upon the Fair Housing Act of
1968 and prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing;
42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1970) is based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and protects against
discrimination with regard to the right to vote; and
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) are based upon the Age Discrimination Act
of 1967 and ensure against discrimination in employment on the basis of age.
3. For discussion of the legislative history see Brown v. General Services Administration,
425 U.S. 820 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (§ 1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)
(§ 1983).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986 (1970) protect against a wide variety of discrimi-
natory conduct; however, detailing of the substantive protections of these or other civil rights
statutes is beyond the scope of this article.
5. E.g., compare 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 to 3631 (1970 & Supp. V
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same kind of discriminatory conduct is in issue, the questions of who
may be held liable and what relief may be sought may vary depend-
ing upon what statute one relies.6
The confusion is not only attributable to the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments and the acts of Congress passed pursuant
thereto, but also to their application in related areas of law and
policy. One area is federal jurisdiction. Although all the summa-
rized statutes derive their authority from the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments, the Constitution itself does not invoke juris-
diction to hear such matters. Congress, pursuant to its constitu-
tional authority, determines the jurisdiction of the district courts
through enabling statutes; the two most often used are 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The confusion concerning the interplay
between these jurisdictional statutes, the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments and the aforementioned discrimination statutes adds
to the overall confusion surrounding the issues of liability and relief.
The effect of the eleventh amendment is another piece in the
liability and relief puzzle which is in a state of flux, further contrib-
uting to the confusion. Presenting additional complications are the
doctrines of sovereign immunity and the role of the federal courts,
vis-a-vis Congress, in exacting liability and fashioning remedies for
constitutional wrongs.
This article cannot provide an underlying principle embodying all
the nonsubstantive factors affecting the issues of liability and relief
in a federally filed private action to redress discrimination under
color of state law; likely one does not exist. Nor can it set out
definitively, assuming a meritorious claim, who, among the respon-
sible parties, may be held liable and what relief may be obtained.
1975) and compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-5 (1970) and
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
6. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) protects, inter alia, against racial and sexual discrimina-
tion in employment when the defendants are acting under color of state law. The state and
local entities themselves are not liable under section 1983, but rather the responsible officials
are held liable and may be subject to injunctive relief and, if acting in bad faith, out of pocket
compensatory and punitive damages. See text on Section 1983 at Part IV infra. Alternatively,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act allows back pay and attorneys' fees against state and
local entities as well as against the federal government and employers in the private sector,
as a means of redressing employment discrimination but neither compensatory damages,
outside of back pay and attorneys' fees, nor punitive damages may be obtained thereunder.
1977]
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There are too many factual contingencies and too many related
issues that remain unresolved. The purpose is to limit discussion to
the most often used statutory and constitutional means for seeking
redress and examine the more troublesome nonsubstantive consid-
erations that bear on the issues of liability and relief, pointing out
the pitfalls to be avoided and devices to be utilized to maximize, or
minimize from the defendant's standpoint, the chances of holding
parties liable and obtaining meaningful relief.
I. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
There has been an abundance of scholarly theorizing about the
eleventh amendment,7 but the amendment's evolving and increas-
ingly complex nature, and the consequential impact on the issues
of liability and relief in privately filed discrimination actions in
federal court against a state necessitates additional discussion.
Generalizing from a functional view, the eleventh amendment
shields the state from private actions in federal court.8 But this
general functional definition has many qualifications and its appli-
cation has proven to be a complex undertaking for the judiciary.
A. Unconstitutional State Statute Not Protected
A significant qualification was given birth by the Supreme Court
7. The eleventh amendment was ratified on January 8, 1798, and reads as follows:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
For a discussion of the historical basis and evolvement of the eleventh amendment from a
theoretical standpoint, see generally C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY (1972); Callison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White
Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HOUSTON L. REv. 1 (1967); and Comment, State Sovereign
Immunity: No More King's X?, 52-TEx. L. REv. 100 (1973).
8. Although the scope of this article is limited to private rights of action, it is important
to note that suits by the United States are not barred by the eleventh amendment. See United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965). Nor are suits barred which are brought by
one state against another. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
While the eleventh amendment by its terms does not bar suits against the state by its own
citizens, an unconsenting state is nevertheless immune from suits brought in federal court
by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974).
Also basic, but extremely important, the eleventh amendment is no bar to private actions
against the state in state court though other immunities may be applicable under state law.
[Vol. 12:85
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in Ex parte Young. 9 As logic would dictate, the eleventh amendment
precludes circumvention of its protection by obtaining money dam-
ages from the state through suits against state officials."° The logic
was cut short, however, by the Ex parte Young doctrine that the
immunity is no bar to a private action forcing state agents to con-
form their conduct to the mandates of the Constitution even though
to do so may be in derogation of state law." Hence, when the offi-
cials, who are responsible for effectuating unconstitutional state
law, policies or directives, are the named parties defendant, the suit
is deemed to fall outside the scope of the immunity, though in
actuality the state, through its officials, is subject to federal juris-
diction for the limited purpose of affording prospective equitable
relief.12
B. Limitation Upon Relief From Unconstitutional State Statute
The fiction created in Ex parte Young understandably added to
the confusion surrounding the issue of when the state is a real party
in interest for eleventh amendment purposes. Edelman v. Jordan3
allayed some of the confusion in holding that a retroactive award of
monetary relief in a private action filed in federal court is, in practi-
cal effect, indistinguishable from an award of money damages
9. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
10. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall found that the amendment was applicable
only when the state was a party of record. Later cases came to the more logical conclusion
that the eleventh amendment barred liability and relief insofar as the state was a real party
in interest. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
11. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
12. Generally speaking, and without regard to the substance of the action, unconstitutional
conduct of state officials may fall into one of two classes: (1) conduct under color of state
law but not authorized or directed by the state, and (2) conduct not only under color of state
law but authorized or directed by the state. Both classes of conduct fall outside the eleventh
amendment immunity insofar as prospective injunctive relief and damages paid out of the
personal pockets of the defendant, officials, are concerned. In the first class of conduct the
non-applicability of the immunity is understandable as the conduct is in derogation of the
official's duty and prohibition of the same would not affect the state in exercising its authority
or carrying out its directives through its agents. In the second class of conduct, however, its
prohibition would, and may significantly, affect the authority of directives of the state and
thus in essence amounts to the exercise of jurisdiction over the state through its agents. This
being the case, logic would dictate that the latter class of conduct would fall within the
immunity of the eleventh amendment. The law as laid down in Ex parte Young, however, is
otherwise.
13. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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against the state. Edelman held that such an award is barred by the
eleventh amendment notwithstanding the fact that the suit con-
cerns unconstitutional behavior. But the Court went on to say:
State officials, in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate
of the Court's decrees, would more likely have to spend money from
the state treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their
previous course of conduct. Such an ancillary affect on the state
treasury is a permissable and often inevitable consequence of the
principle announced in Ex parte Young, supra.14
Hence, Edelman interprets the eleventh amendment, in a suit
claiming a denial of a constitutional right, as allowing prospective
injunctive relief against state officials regardless of the indirect cost
to the state but as barring any direct payment of funds from the
state to the plaintiff regardless of whether it carries the label of
equitable restitution or money damages. 5
C. When Is A State A Real Party In Interest
Read in light of Ex parte Young and Edelman, the eleventh
amendment issue is settled by a determination of what constitutes
direct payment of funds from the state. Thus far the Supreme Court
has made this much certain: If private parties are seeking relief in
federal courts which involves direct payment to plaintiff from out
of the general public funds of the state treasury then the state is a
real party in interest with respect to this relief and the eleventh
amendment immunity applies. 6 Beyond this limited answer uncer-
tainty remains, though numerous federal courts, in conflicting deci-
sions, have attempted to round out the rule. 7 Therefore, if the relief
14. Id. at 668.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
17. An excellent detailing of the multifarious judicial attempts to determine the applicabil-
ity of the eleventh amendment where the state is not a named party can be found in Note, A
Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment - Lower Court Interpretations and the Supreme
Court's Reactions, 61 GEOG. L. REv. 1473, notes 60-114 and accompanying text (1973). It
would be pointless to reiterate what is contained therein; however, the text and the footnotes
cited above should be read to make oneself generally informed as to the problem. It will
become evident, however, that not only is there general uncertainty as to when the state is a
real party in interest but there is also uncertainty as to what test or tests are to be applied to
[Vol. 12:85
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sought in a particular case requires payment other than directly out
of the general public funds of the state treasury, the case law in the
jurisdiction involved should be examined before drawing conclu-
sions as to the applicability of the eleventh amendment.
The foregoing qualifications define the general attributes of the
immunity in private suits seeking redress from the state for consti-
tutional wrongs. There are, however, two substantial qualifications
of a different nature that also apply to such actions: the doctrine of
waiver and the abrogation of the immunity by acts of Congress
passed pursuant to overriding provisions of the Constitution.
D. The Doctrine of Waiver
The doctrine of waiver in simplest terms means that the state
consents to be sued in federal court and thereby relinquishes its
immunity afforded by the eleventh amendment.'8 In application,
however, the doctrine is not so simple since what constitutes waiver
must first be determined.
There are two judicially recognized classes of waiver-expressed
waiver and implied waiver. The former is somewhat easier to com-
prehend than the latter and will therefore be discussed first.
1. Express Waiver
A state may, by its constitution, by statute'" or where otherwise
silent on the issue, by judicial decision,"° consent to be sued in
answer this question. Also note that the Note was written prior to Edelman which puts a
limiting gloss on the cases cited which grant retroactive monetary relief.
There are, however, a few areas of certainty that should be mentioned such as Supreme
Court holdings that neither municipalities nor counties are immunized by the eleventh
amendment. Mount Health City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568, 572 (1977)
and Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
Notwithstanding the uncertainty as to the applicable test to determine whether a political
entity is deemed to be an agency of the state, some factors that have been considered by some
courts may nevertheless be helpful: (1) Is the agency performing a governmental or properiety
function? (2) Is it separately incorporated? (3) What degree of autonomy does it have over
its operations? (4) Does it have the power to enter into contracts? (5) Is its property immune
from state taxation? and, (6) Has the sovereign immunized itself from the agency's
operations? Gordenstein v. Univ. of Delaware, 381 F. Supp. 718 (D. Del. 1974).
18. See, .g., Gunter v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 285-87 (1906).
19. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945).
20. Id. See also Interstate Const. Co. v. Regents of the Univ. of Idaho, 199 F. 509 (D. Idaho
1912).
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federal court and thereby waive its eleventh amendment rights.
Waiver may be as to all matters or as to a limited class of matters.2'
In either case, the intent to submit to suit in federal court must be
clear and unambiguous" and whether a state has in fact waived its
immunity and consented to be sued is a question of state law.,
When a state, by statute or otherwise, clearly authorizes its offi-
cials to represent its interests in court but does not specify as to
federal court, a general appearance on behalf of the state by an
official so authorized will constitute a waiver of the eleventh amend-
ment's protection as to that suit. 4 When a state does not authorize
its officials to represent its interests in court said officials do not by
general appearance or otherwise waive the state's eleventh amend-
ment rights. 25 Under such circumstances, the eleventh amendment
issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first
time on appeal, by counsel or by the court sua sponte.21
2. Constructive Waiver
The above traditional understanding of the doctrine of waiver was
upset by the Supreme Court in Parden v. Terminal Railway
Company.27 Using the following rationale, the Court found that the
State of Alabama impliedly consented to be sued in federal court
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) :28
By adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the States empow-
ered Congress to create such a right of action against interstate rail-
roads; by enacting the FELA in the exercise of this power, Congress
conditioned the. right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce
upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by
thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama
must be taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have
consented to the suit. . . .We thus agree that "[T]he state is liable,
21. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945).
22. Id. at 468.
23. Id. at 467.
24. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 200 U.S. 273 (1906).
25. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466-69 (1945).
26. Id. at 467.
27. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
28. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
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upon the theory that, by engaging in interstate commerce by rail, it
has subjected itself to the commerce power of the federal govern-
ment.,, 2
Perhaps behind Parden was the unarticulated idea that where a
state ventures outside its traditional role and takes on the character
of a private enterprise conducting business in a federally regulated
area the eleventh amendment is left behind. In other words, a state
can transmute itself into a private entity, but the eleventh amend-
ment will not follow, and when the state chooses to do so, it goes
beyond the scope of that amendment's protection.
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain itself in these terms.
Instead, it announced that the issue of waiver in the context of the
case was a federal question, and, on the basis of the aforementioned
rationale, found that Congress intended for the eleventh amend-
ment immunity to be lifted by the FELA and that the state, by
participation in the regulated area, in effect, consented to be sued
thereby waiving its eleventh amendment protection."
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify Parden in
Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v. De-
partment of Public Health & Welfare,3' but, as most commenta-
tors agree,3 2 the Court failed.3 The Court's overriding concern ap-
peared to be that the state was acting within its proper and tradi-
tional role as a state and thus was within the scope of the eleventh
29. 377 U.S. at 192-93 (citations and quotations omitted).
30. Id.
31. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
32. E.g., Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment - Lower Court Interpretations
and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEoG. L. Rsv. 1473, 1493-98 (1973); Comment, Implied
Waiver of the State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974 DuKE L.J. 925 (1974); Comment,
State Sovereign Immunity: No More King's X?, 52 TEx. L. REV. 100 (1973).
33. State employees were seeking overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216b (Supp. V 1975). The FLSA specifies that state employ-
ees may bring suit in any court of competent jurisdiction but does not specify federal court.
On the other hand, the FELA relied upon in Parden does not specify that a state may be a
defendant but does specify that relief may be had in federal court. Neither statute speaks
directly to the eleventh amendment issue. To say that Congress intended abrogation by
enactment of the FELA but did not so intend by enactment of the FLSA is judicial specula-
tion. But even more tenuous is the connection made by both Parden and Employees of the
Dept. of Public Health & Welfare between the very question of congressional intent to sub"
ject a state to suit and that of the state's waiver of its eleventh amendment rights.
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amendment's protection. But the Court did not speak in these
terms. Instead, it found that Congress did not intend for the state
to forfeit its immunity by acting within the coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and thus the state did not waive its
eleventh amendment protection. 4
Next came down Edelman wherein the Court, citing appropriate
authority, stated that "[iln deciding whether a state has waived
its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we
will find waiver only when stated 'by the most express language or
by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no
room for any other reasonable construction.' "- Edelman appar-
ently was speaking of the traditionally understood express waiver,
not of the constructive or implied waiver created in Parden and
tailored in Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare.
Edelman was based on section 1983 which, unlike the FELA and
FLSA, specifically excludes states from liability as they are not"persons" under the statute .3 The failure to apply the constructive
waiver doctrine apparently rests on this distinction.
Constructive waiver then will not be found where the federal stat-
ute relied upon clearly precludes the state from liability. When the
statute is not clear on this point, the issue of constructive waiver is
left to be resolved by considering the amorphous guidelines of
Parden and Employees of Department of Public Health & Wel-
fare.
Congress' intent to subject the state to suit has bearing on
whether a cause of action against the state was statutorily created
but it has no bearing, in any logical sense, on whether a state has
consented to be sued. The result is anomalous: express consent to
be sued in federal court will constitute a waiver of eleventh amend-
ment rights only when the state's intent is clear and unambiguous;
implied consent may be found regardless of the state's intent, in-
deed, directly contrary to its intent.
34. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
35. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (citations omitted).
36. See, e.g., Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1974); Meyer v. New Jersey,
460 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1972). Although the Supreme Court has not dealt precisely with this
issue no lower court has found a state to be a person under section 1983.
[Vol. 12:85
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Suffice it to say that the doctrine of waiver remains uncertain.
Much has been written on the subject and counsel should consult
these resources37 and the case law in the jurisdiction involved when
the issue may be in question.
E. Abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment by Act of Congress
Pursuant to that Amendment
Perhaps the most significant qualification of the eleventh amend-
ment was pronounced in the recent case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer3 8
The issue in that case was whether, in derogation of the eleventh
amendment's shield of immunity, Congress has power to permit
entry against the state of an award of money damages to a private
individual as a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment. The suit was brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 which was enacted pursuant to section 5
of the fourteenth amendment. Title VII expressly authorizes federal
courts to award back pay and attorneys' fees against a state govern-
ment found to have violated the substantive provisions of the act.4"
The Court in Fitzpatrick held that:
[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principles of state sovereignty
which it embodies . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Con-
gress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropriate legis-
lation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority.
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legisla-
tive authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional
grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitu-
tional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, in deter-
mining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against states or state officials which are constitutionally imper-
missable in other contexts."
37. See note 1 supra.
38. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-5 (1970 and Supp. V 1975).
40. 427 U.S. at 447-48.
41. 427 U.S. at 456 (citations omitted).
19771
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The Court in Fitzpatrick distinguished Edelman and delimited
that ruling to the absence of congressional authorization to sue a
state in a section 1983 action, a state not being a "person," while
such authorization was clearly present in Title VII. This congres-
sional authorization distinction was relatively meaningless in con-
trasting Parden with Edelman" because the issue in Parden was
purportedly waived by the state. The same distinction in contrast-
ing Edelman and Fitzpatrick is significant because here we are talk-
ing about Congress' power to abrogate the eleventh amendment
pursuant to constitutional authority. In such a case the focus is
properly on congressional intent while the focus in Parden should
have been on the state's intent, assuming waiver was really the
issue.
Although Fitzpatrick is limited to its facts, the implication
thereof is that any act of Congress passed pursuant to section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment which expressly allows for relief against
the state abrogates the eleventh amendment to the extent of the
relief from the state which the statute so authorizes. Conversely,
Fitzpatrick implies that the creation of a private right of action by
act of Congress passed pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment which does not expressly authorize relief from a state
does not have the effect of abrogating the eleventh amendment.
If Fitzpatrick is read correctly, the Court has endowed Congress
with a reservoir of power, for the most part untapped, to emasculate
the eleventh amendment immunity by mere legislation enacted
under authority of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, if the logic of the Fitzpatrick holding is followed in
analogous contexts, the Court will be constrained to find that Con-
42. Note that both Title VII and section 1983 derive their authority from section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. The distinction between the two on the eleventh amendment issue
is not literally mandated by the Constitution, but Fitzpatrick has apparently interpreted
section 5 as providing that the relationship between the eleventh and fourteenth amendments
with regard to statutes passed pursuant to the latter is a function of congressional intent. Also
keep in mind that the statutes in issue in the Parden and Employees of Department of Public
Health & Welfare cases were based on the commerce clause which was adopted prior to the
eleventh amendment and thus presents a weaker basis for the authorization of Congress to
override the eleventh amendment. Perhaps this is why the Supreme Court in Parden and
Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare, though looking at congressional in-
tent, felt constrained to create the constructive waiver doctrine.
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gress has the same power with respect to acts passed pursuant to
the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment. Although this
amendment, read as a whole, does not expressly embody the limita-
tions on state authority as does the fourteenth amendment, 3 it is
well settled that the provisions of the thirteenth amendment impose
limitations on private action and state, as well as federal, author-
ity." Thus, Congress would appear to have power to abrogate the
eleventh amendment, by an act of Congress passed pursuant to
what must be considered the overriding provisions of the thirteenth
or fourteenth amendments.
F. Summary of the Eleventh Amendment
A basic point is that the eleventh amendment issue should be
considered in every private discrimination suit filed in federal court
wherein the state is a named party or is possibly a real party in
interest. To date no act of Congress, including Title VII, has abro-
gated a state's eleventh amendment immunity in its entirety. In all
such cases the amendment's possible effect upon the issues of liabil-
ity and relief requires thought.
Since all discrimination cases are ultimately based on the charge
of unconstitutional conduct, and thereby come under the doctrine
of Ex parte Young, a plaintiff should take the precaution of naming
all responsible officials as parties defendant. By so doing, at the very
least, prospective injunctive relief may be obtained.45 Further, some
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states "no state shall. .. ."
44. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968).
45. Ex parte Young does not make it clear whether a state official must be sued in his
individual or official capacity in order to obtain injunctive relief with regard to his duties as
a state official. One would think that he would be properly sued in his official capacity as
his behavior in this capacity is the subject of the suit, but the language of the case hints to
the contrary. 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908). The Court said that when a state official comes in
conflict with the Constitution he is "stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct." Id. But see Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 532 F.2d 259 (2nd Cir. 1976), which states "[there is no
doubt that municipal and state officials sued in their official capacities, are 'persons' within
the meaning of § 1983 when they are sued for injunctive or declaratory relief." Id. at 264.
Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 7 (4th Cir. 1975); Dyson v. Lavery, 417 F. Supp. 103, 109 (E.D.
Va. 1976). Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may make the issue moot in that it
states, "it is not necessary to aver capacity" of a party except to the extent required to show
jurisdiction. The issue is not definitively resolved, however, and to be safe counsel should sue
the official in both his individual and official capacity.
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lower federal courts have found, that as against such defendants,
attorneys' fees would not be barred. The courts' reasoning has been
that as with prospective injunctive relief, the effect upon the state
is ancillary in nature."
Aside from the eleventh amendment issue, if plaintiff is seeking damages from out of the
personal pocket of the official, a suit against said defendant in his individual capacity would
be the proper averment for this purpose.
46. E.g., Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 6-8 (4th Cir. 1975). See also Amos v. Sinis, 409
U.S. 942 (1972) wherein the Court summarily affirmed a three judge court's award of attor-
neys' fees against state officials acting in their official capacities. See generally Dowell v.
Board of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
However, Edelman, while not speaking directly to the issue of attorneys' fees, cast doubt
on earlier case holdings that such an award paid out of state funds does not affront the
eleventh amendment.
Coupled with the eleventh amendment problem is the Alyeska roadblock which, with few
exceptions, disallows attorneys' fees unless expressly provided by statute. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 267-68 (1975). The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. 1977), expressly obviates the Alyeska road-
block in actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1970); Title IX of Pub. L.
92-318; and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, however,
may not overcome the eleventh amendment problem for the statutes it covers. Furthermore
Edelman must still be considered when the auxiliary relief rationale is relied on for allowing
attorneys' fees.
There is an important distinction between the ancillary relief rationale exemplified in
Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975) and the rationale enunciated in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1977). In the former, the rationale is that an award of attorneys' fees
would not affront the eleventh amendment. In Fitzpatrick, the Court reasoned that Title VII
abrogated the eleventh amendment to the extent of allowing back pay and attorneys' fees.
Recently several district courts have awarded attorneys' fees against the state holding that
various statutes enacted pursuant to the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment
in conjunction with the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act has abrogated the eleventh amendment
to the extent of allowing attorneys' fees. Finney v. Hutto, 548 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1977)
(section 1983 action); Wade v. Mississippi, 424 F. Supp. 1242, 1254-57 (N.D. Miss. 1976)
(section 1981 action which is based upon the thirteenth amendment, yet the court argues as
if it were based upon the fourteenth amendment). Fitzpatrick, which was heavily relied upon
in all of these cases, focused on the fact that congressional authorization to sue the state was
clearly present in Title VII. See also Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 73 F.R.D. 30, 37-39
(W.D. Mich. 1976) involving the attorneys' fees statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1617, (Supp. V 1975)
which clearly allowed such an award against the state in suits under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act. Such is not clearly present in the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act nor in the civil
rights statutes relied on in these cases. For example section 1983, the basis of the suit in
Finney v. Hutto, 548 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1977), applies to discrimination under color of
state law but excludes the state itself as a party defendant. The Attorneys' Fees Awards Act
does not express an intent to amend section 1983 to allow an award of attorneys' fees from
the state. Indeed the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act can be read consistently with section 1983
without amending the person requirement in that attorneys' fees can be obtained from the
responsible government officials if they act in bad faith. Fitzpatrick distinguished Edelman,
a section 1983 action, by emphasizing that under Title VII congressional authorization to sue
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As noted, Ex parte Young and Edelman teach that where the
relief sought requires direct payment of funds to the plaintiff, the
issue of whether the state or its agencies is a real party in interest
will turn on examination of the source of the funds. Where the
monies do not come directly out of general public funds of the state
treasury, counsel on either side of this issue may find precedent to
support his position.
Once the conclusion is drawn that the state is a real party in
interest, one must consider the applicability of the doctrine of
waiver and keep in mind that its application is more complex than
a reasonable understanding of the term would indicate. When the
state acts, unlike a state in a federally regulated area, and when
Congress has created private rights of action, implied waiver may
be found.
To reiterate, the effect of the eleventh amendment upon the is-
sues of liability and relief may vary depending upon what statute
is relied upon by the plaintiff. Because the same substantive claim
may create a cause of action under different statutes, counsel should
give thought to all possible bases upon which relief may be granted.
For instance, an employment discrimination claim may be brought
under either Title VII, section 1981 or section 1983. Title VII, for the
aforementioned reasons, abrogates the immunity to the extent of
affording the relief of back pay and attorneys' fees against the state.
To date sections 1981 and 1983 have not been found to abrogate the
immunity for any purpose except, possibly, for award of attorneys
the state for back pay and attorneys' fees was "clearly present." 427 U.S. at 452. It would be
a distortion of Fitzpatrick to say that merely by creating a cause of action pursuant to its
authority under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, Congress thereby implicitly
abrogates the eleventh amendment. It is submitted that express intent to hold the state liable
for attorneys' fees should be clear from the statute. But the case law thus far does not appear
to reflect this view.
The significance of Fitzpatrick to the discrimination statutes other than Title VII is not
crucial to the question of attorneys' fees which, depending on the reading of Edelman, may
be recoverable in any event under the ancillary relief rationale, but it is of utmost importance
to the question of damages which in no instance may be construed as ancillary relief not
affronting the eleventh amendment. For example, the Fitzpatrick doctrine raises, but does
not answer, the issue of whether damages are awardable against the state in a section 1981
action, assuming, as many courts do, that the state is a proper party under that statute.
In short, Fitzpatrick opens the door for re-evaluation of all the discrimination statutes with
respect to the plausibility of exacting money damages from the state in derogation of the
eleventh amendment.
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fees. Thus, when considering the eleventh amendment, it is essen-
tial to be aware and understand the nature of the various laws upon
which a particular discrimination claim may be based in order to
maximize the potential to establish liability and obtain relief.
Finally, a defense of immunity under the eleventh amendment,
when applicable, is jurisdictional in nature and may be raised at
any time by any party or by the court, sua sponte, providing appear-
ance, as earlier discussed, does not constitute a waiver of this right.
III. SECTION 1983
Section 1983,11 passed pursuant to the enabling clause of the four-
teenth amendment 8 creates a federal cause of action against per-
sons acting under color of state law who violate the rights guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment49 and federal law, including the
right to be free from invidious discrimination." In comparison to its
sister civil rights statutes, sections 1981 and 1982, section 1983 is
broader in scope as to substantive protection and narrower in scope
as to those subject to liability.51 Unlike claims under the former two
47. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizens of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Act of 20 April 1871, 17 Stat. 13), codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) was given birth in an attempt to cure the pervasive lawlessness in
the reconstruction South. Newly emancipated Negro citizens, as well as white citizens who
supported and advocated Negro rights, were afforded minuscule protection from violence by
the Ku Klux Klan and, in many instances, local and state officers. Although the need for
section 1983 was great, it lay practically dormant, as did most of the early civil rights legisla-
tion, until the 1950's.
For accounts of the conditions and attrocities that gave rise to section 1983 see CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. (1871) and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
48. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
49. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 is quoted in full in note 1 supra.
50. It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intoler-
ance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment might be denied by the state agencies.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
51. Section 1981, traceable to section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was passed pursur-
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sections, a section 1983 complaint must allege, in addition to juris-
diction,5 2 violation of a pre-existing federal right and action under
color of state law 3 in order to withstand a motion to dismiss. In
other words, section 1983 does not, at least in theory,54 establish new
federal rights but rather creates a federal cause of action protecting
already existing rights from violations by persons acting under color
of state law. Nevertheless, section 1983 creates an independent
cause of action unaffected by restrictions of overlapping statutes.5
Federal jurisdiction under this section is easily attainable." There
is no amount in controversy requirement, 7 nor is it necessary for a
section 1983 litigant to exhaust his available remedies under state
law. 8 Even though state courts have concurrent jurisdiction,59 liti-
ant to the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment and was enacted before the fourteenth
amendment was even formally proposed. Since the thirteenth amendment may be violated
in the absence of state action, section 1981 reaches discriminatory actions taken by private
parties.
Section 1982 also had its origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was reenacted, after
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, in an act of May 31, 1870. This section finds
constitutional support not only in the implementing clause of the fourteenth amendment, but
in the implementing clause of the thirteenth amendment as well. Hence, this section in its
application need not be limited to state action or color of law cases. The rights under these
statutes, however, are not as broad as the rights protected by the fourteenth amendment.
52. The appropriate jurisdiction basis for a section 1983 claim is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)
which provides the following:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of
any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States.
53. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
54. Although theoretically section 1983 protects against violations of preexisting rights, the
recent upsurge of section 1983 suits has brought out heretofore unasserted aspects of these
rights with the effect of broadening the traditional understanding of their nature.
55. Cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
56. See note 52 supra.
57. Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 993 (3d Cir. 1973).
58. In McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963), the Supreme Court held that
exhaustion of state administrative remedies was not a prerequisite to seeking relief under
section 1983.
59. As early as 1876 the Supreme Court held that states are not precluded from taking
jurisdiction over a federal claim when the controlling federal statute does not expressly or
impliedly place exclusive jurisdiction in a federal court. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130
(1876). For recent cases recognizing concurrent state jurisdiction over section 1983 claims, see,
e.g., International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:85
gants rarely assert this privilege, because a federal forum is gener-
ally preferable."0
As is true with the other civil rights statutes, various procedural
hurdles to exacting liability and obtaining relief will confront the
practitioner proceeding under section 1983.
A. "Person" Problems
One hurdle often encountered under section 1983 is whether the
defendant is a "person""1 within the meaning of the statute.
Relying heavily on section 1983's legislative history, the Supreme
Court in Monroe v. Pape2 began what was to become a long line of
cases which attempted to define this statutory term.63 In Monroe,
the Court concluded that in a suit for money damages under section
1983 a municipal corporation is not a "person" within the meaning
of the section, at least for the purpose of such a suit. 4 This case was
followed by Moor v. County of Alameda,15 in which the Supreme
Court held that counties, like municipalities, are "nonpersons"
within the meaning of section 1983. As both Monroe and Moor con-
cerned only actions for damages, many lower courts were interpret-
ing these decisions as not precluding equitable actions against gov-
ernmental entities.6 However, in City of Kenosha v. Bruno,"7 the
For a case in which a section 1983 action was actually brought in a state court, see Hirych
v. State, 376 Mich. 384, 136 N.W.2d 910 (1976).
60. Since an action under section 1983 is, in many instances, an action against a state
official, a federal forum is normally preferable to a state forum. Additionally, the federal
judiciary is better attuned to handling civil rights cases and evidentiary rules enjoy a more
liberal construction in federal courts.
61. The defendant must be a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. Fine v. City of
New York, 529 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1975).
62. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
63. In Monroe, Mr. Justice Douglas dismissed as being surplusage the definition of
"person" provided by the Dictionary Act, Ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871), which stated, "the
word person may extend and be applied to bodies politic incorporate .... 365 U.S. at 191.
It is worthy to note that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and Dictionary Act of 1871 were before
Congress for consideration at the same time and it would therefore seem unlikely that the
members intended that the same meaning should not apply to the word "person."
64. 365 U.S. at 191.
65. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
66. Several cases had held that Monroe did not bar suits under section 1983 against munici-
palities for injunctive relief. E.g., Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, 439 F.2d 140, 141 (4th
Cir. 1971); Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319, 321-23 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971). Mr. Justice Douglas stated in his dissent in Moor
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Supreme Court disposed of the issue by holding that a municipality
is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute in both damage
and equitable actions. 8 Hence, the aggrieved party will be pre-
cluded from joining either a municipality or a county as a party
defendant in a section 1983 action regardless of the relief sought.
In addition to municipalities and counties, the "person" require-
ment may preclude suit against various other political entities de-
pending on the judicial circuit in which the case is tried. 9 The
practical effects of this hurdle are not as substantial as appears at
first blush. Lower courts have held that though a governmental
entity may not be a "person" within the purview of section 1983,
officials of that entity are and may be sued in their official capaci-
ties. The plaintiff, however, will normally be restricted to equitable
relief,70 since the official is an agent of the state. Damages, therefore,
would come from the state coffers and the eleventh amendment
immunity precludes such recovery.7' Paralleling this principle, the
that despite the overtones of Monroe the Supreme Court had never expressly held that section
1983 barred suits in equity against municipalities. 411 U.S. at 723.
67. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
68. It is important to note that the Court in Kenosha did not exclude the possibility that
a city can be properly named defendant under the general federal question jurisdiction stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) if the $10,000 statutory requirement was met. 412 U.S. at 514.
69. Among the list of "nonpersons" added by the lower courts are the following: e.g., school
boards, Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690, 691 (5th Cir. 1975), and Huntley
v. State Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1017 n.2 (4th Cir. 1974); universities, Prostrollo v.
University of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 777 n.1 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975),
and Blanton v. State Univ. of N.Y., 489 F.2d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 1973); arms of the state
government, Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586, 587-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868
(1974). See Note, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HRv. L. REV. 1, 258 (1973), which
states: "There seems little doubt that the reasoning of Bruno is not limited to municipalities
but applies to all agencies of state and local government." See also Patterson v. Ramsey, Civil
No. Y-75-964, at 7 (D. Md., March 29, 1976) (school board not a person under section 1983);
Meyer v. New Jersey, 460 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1972)(state not a person); Olson v. California
Adult Auth., 423 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970) (state agencies which
are but arms of the state government are not persons for purposes of section 1983); Francis
v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md. 1972). As the language of section 1983 restricts suits
brought under it to persons acting pursuant to state or territorial law, federal agencies and
personnel are not normally liable under it. It may be possible to bring these defendants within
the ambit of section 1983, however, if it can be shown that there existed a joint conspiracy or
concert of action by federal and state personnel. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448-49
(2d. Cir. 1969).
70. Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1205-06 n.6 (4th Cir. 1975).
71. Although the principles of the eleventh amendment immunity parallel those of the
person requirement of section 1983, they are distinct legal concepts and should be treated as
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"person" requirement precludes use of local officials as a conduit to
recover damages from the coffers of the locality.
Plaintiff may recover damages from the responsible official sued
in his individual capacity, providing plaintiff establishes that the
defendant acted in bad faith in performing his official duties result-
ing in the unconstitutional discrimination.7 2 Since a good faith de-
fense is often difficult for a plaintiff to overcome, however, obtaining
a personal monetary judgment is unlikely. There are, however, al-
ternative avenues for obtaining full and effective relief from viola-
tions of the same rights as those protected under section 1983. These
alternatives are discussed later in this article.
B. Immunities
The civil rights acts in general, and section 1983 in particular, are
cast in terms so broad as to suggest that in suits brought under these
sections common law doctrines of immunity can never be a bar and
both the language and the purpose of section 1983 are seemingly
inconsistent with the application of such immunities. In section
1983 suits, an indispensable element of the plaintiff's case is a show-
ing that the defendant acted under color of state law. This test can
rarely be satisfied in the case of anyone other than a state official;
therefore, to hold that all state officials in suits brought under sec-
tion 1983 enjoy an immunity similar to what they might enjoy in
suits brought under state law would practically constitute a judicial
repeal of the Civil Rights Acts. Nevertheless, the federal courts have
narrowed the scope of these acts by applying certain common law
notions of official immunity from suit. 3 These courts have acted
such to avoid confusion that may prejudice the case. For example, a state agency may be
deemed to have waived its eleventh amendment immunity but nevertheless may be immune
from suit under section 1983 because of the person requirement.
72. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See also discussion of the eleventh amend-
ment, Part II supra.
73. One of the earliest immunities established under section 1983 was legislative immunity.
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). The Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Frankfurter held that the immunity of legislators for acts within the legislative role was not
abolished. Unworthy purpose or bad faith were noted in the opinion not to destroy the
privilege. The Court reasoned that since Congress had historically viewed legislative freedom
and flexibility as of critical importance to the democratic scheme of government, it would
have expressly stated that legislators were personally liable in section 1983 suits had it so
intended. Id. at 376. But see Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 1973); Nelson
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sparingly, however, in the incorporation and treatment of these
immunities. 4 Moreover, there is a diversity of judicial opinion con-
cerning the purview of particular immunities; 75 thus, the case law
in the jurisdiction in question should be consulted. The important
point is that federal courts have the final say regarding the applica-
bility of such immunities in section 1983 suits brought before their
bar; they may be adopted or abrogated, in whole or in part, as
justice requires.
If the defendant is protected by an immunity, the practitioner
must determine whether it is a qualified immunity as enjoyed by
executive officers,"' school board members, 7 and policemen, 8 or
whether it is an absolute immunity as enjoyed by judges,79 legisla-
tors,"0 and prosectuors. 1 An absolute immunity protects a defendant
v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312, 314-15 (6th Cir. 1958). One of the first immunities to follow the
legislative immunity discussed above was judicial immunity:
Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction
.... This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly, and it "is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge,
but for the benefit of the public whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty
to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences .... "
His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied
litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (citations omitted). As Pierson involved damages,
the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether judicial immunity applies to equitable
actions under section 1983. Federal courts have discussed the issue. E.g., Peckham v. Scan-
Ion, 241 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1957); Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955) (judges
are immune from equitable relief under section 1983).
Closely related is quasi-judicial immunity. See Note, Quasi-Judicial Immunity: Its Scope
and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DuKE L.J. 95 (1976). Included within this
classification have been such officers as clerks of court, parole board members, prison offi-
cials, court reporters, jurors, sheriffs and police officers.
Next came executive immunity, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); prosecutorial
immunity, Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); and
administrative immunity, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
74. See Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1966).
75. For an excellent discussion of immunities under section 1983, see McCormack, Immu-
nities of State Officials Under Section 1983, 8 Rur.-CAM. L.J. 65 (1976).
76. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
77. Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1206 (4th Cir. 1975).
78. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 244-45 (1974).
79. The immunity afforded judges for official acts is absolute despite the absence of a
constitutional provision comparable to the one protecting legislators. See Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
80. Legislators enjoy an absolute immunity when acting within the scope of their legislative
duties. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). Such immunity is explicitly conferred on
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without regard to his purpose, motive or the reasonableness of his
conduct, whereas the protection of a qualified immunity hinges
upon the defendant's good faith" and the reasonableness of his be-
havior. If the defendant falls within the latter, the practitioner must
then determine if the defendant's conduct meets the criteria neces-
sary to trigger the immunity.
Although public policy reasons justify both absolute and qualified
immunities of certain defendants from damages, the overwhelming
weight of authority is against extending the immunity doctrine to a
case seeking injunctive relief. 3
C. Statute of Limitations
As no federal statute provides a limitation period for section 1983,
the controlling period is ordinarily the most appropriate one pro-
vided by state law. 4 Hence, as a general rule of thumb, the applica-
ble period of limitations is the one which state courts would apply
if the action were brought in a state court under state law."5 Al-
federal congressmen by the Constitution "for any Speech or Debate in either House." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6. This section has been broadly construed by the courts.
81. Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Court
noted: "[tlhe public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in
making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit
for damages." 424 U.S. at 424-25.
82. But see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), in which the Supreme Court held that
the official must not only be acting in good faith, "with a belief that he is doing right," but
also his actions cannot be justified by ignorance of "settled, indisputable law." Id. at 322.
Accordingly, if the official knew or reasonably should have known that his actions would
violate a person's constitutional rights, or "if he took the action with the malicious intention"
of violating constitutional rights, he should not be immune from section 1983 liability. Id. at
321-22.
83. A complaint against a judge under section 1983 seeking equitable relief alone might
well be successful. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), where an injunction under
section 1983 was upheld against state court proceedings the Court, per Justice Stewart,
stated, "it is clear from the legislative debate surrounding passage of section 1983's predeces-
sor that the act was intended to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against
state action . . . whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial." Id. at 240. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit states: "[N]o sound reason exists for holding that
federal courts should not have the power to issue injunctive relief against the commission of
acts in violation of a plaintiff's civil rights by state judges acting in their official capacity."
Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
84. Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 414 U.S.
859 (1973). Cf., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). See Note,
Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 Aazz. ST. L.J. 97.
85. Hileman v. Knable, 391 F.2d 596, 597 (3d Cir. 1968). Many federal courts apply a
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though state law is the primary guide in this area, it is not the
exclusive one. Considerations of state law may be displaced where
their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy un-
derlying the particular federal right upon which the section 1983
action is based. 6
D. Relief Available
Notwithstanding the "person" problems, plaintiff may rely on
federal or state statutory or common law remedies, which best effec-
tuate full and satisfactory relief.8 7 Furthermore, research has re-
vealed several cases wherein a political entity was deemed a"person" within the meaning of section 1983.5 Although the cases
did not deal with the issue of the recovery of damages, logic dictates
that such relief would be available from political entities. As men-
tioned earlier, damages are also available from the responsible offi-
cials if acting in bad faith.89
In addition to compensatory damages,"9 punitive damages may be
available against such officials. But note that the bad faith test for
compensatory damages awarded from said official's pockets may
differ from the bad faith test for obtaining punitive damages from
the same.'
"resemblance test," and utilize the state limitation statute applicable to the state cause of
action most closely resembling the action under the civil rights statutes. Sotomura v. County
of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95, 103-04 (D. Hawaii 1975).
86. Cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1976).
87. See generally text and notes of section 1988 Part IV infra.
88. E.g., Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist., 509 F.2d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 1975)
(school district found to be a "person" for section 1983 purposes); Wright v. Arkansas Activi-
ties Ass'n., 501 F.2d 25, 28 (8th Cir. 1974) (voluntary association of schools is a "person");
Aurora Educ. Ass'n East v. Board of Educ., 490 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1973) (school board
is a "person" under section 1983).
89. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), see note 82 and accompanying text supra.
90. Whether or not actual damages have been proven, nominal damages may be recovered
as the constitutional rights of a citizen are considered to be so valuable to him that an injury
is presumed to flow from the deprivation itself. As stated in United States ex rel. Motley v.
Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1972): "In most cases when a public official denies
rights that the citizen felt were secure under our Constitution, the result is hurt feelings,
outrage, embarrassment or humiliation and nominal damages may be awarded for these
natural consequences of lawless action by state officials."
91. Although no case speaks directly to this point, it appears, and justifiably so, that the
"bad faith" test for punitive damages is more rigorous than the "bad faith" test articulated
in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), for out of pocket compensatory damages. As
stated by the Supreme Court in Wood:
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The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 197652 provides
federal courts with discretionary authority to award attorneys' fees
to prevailing parties when proceeding under section 1983. Although
not explicit in the language of the statute, the legislative history
discloses that Congress intended payment from the responsible ent-
ity rather than out of the pockets of the officials thereof. However,
in a suit involving state officials as defendants, it is not yet clear
whether such awards can be made in light of the eleventh amend-
ment.9"
[tihe official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right,
but an act violating a student's constitutional rights can be no more justified by
ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on the part of one entrusted with
supervision of students' daily lives than by the presence of actual malice.
Id. at 321. In holding that the bad faith test contains both "subjective" and "objective"
elements, the Court went on to establish a bad faith standard regarding out of pocket dam-
ages by holding:
a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected,
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights or other injury to the student.
Id. at 322. The bad faith test regarding punitive damages as enunciated by the Federal
District Court of New Jersey in Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971), appears
to be more rigorous. As stated by that court, "(plunitive damages should not be awarded in
a § 1983 proceeding unless there is a showing that the proscribed action has been a constant
pattern or practice of behavior of defendants and that such practice has been willful and in
gross disregard for the rights of plaintiff." Id. at 170. In accord with this standard is Lee v.
Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the following was held:
The general rule as to punitive damages, repeatedly found in the reported cases, is
that they may be imposed if a defendant has acted wilfully and in gross disregard for
the rights of the complaining party. Since such damages are punitory and are assessed
as an example and warning to others, . . . they are not a favorite in law and are to be
allowed only with caution and within narrow limits ....
Id. at 294.
92. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. 1977).
93. See generally notes and accompanying text on the eleventh amendment Part II supra.
Compare, Note, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 34 WASH. & LFZ L.
REv. 205, 221 (1977) wherein it is stated that such award can be made even though it will
ultimately be paid from state funds. This note finds support for such position in S. REP. No.
1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), which reads in part as follows:
in such cases it is intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs, will be
collected either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his
agency or under his control, or from the State or local government (whether or not the
agency or government is a named party.)
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IV. THE OTHER 1980's
A. Section 1981
Much of what has been said about section 1983 also applies to
section 1981 so the focus herein is limited to the distinctions that
are important for the purposes of this article.
Section 1981 is narrower in scope of substantive protection than
section 198315 but it is broader in scope as to those subject to liabil-
ity." A literal reading of section 1981 discloses no restrictions as to
exacting liability and obtaining relief. There is, however, a split of
judicial opinion over whether state and local governmental entities
are subject to suit thereunder, that is, whether the "person" require-
ment of section 1983 applies to section 1981.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) states in pertinent part: "All persons ... shall have the same
right in every State. . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." Jurisdiction for this section is invoked pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) which, unlike 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (1970), does not
require a minimum amount of value in controversy. It is important to note that section 1981
creates an independent cause of action for various acts of racial discrimination. See note 95
infra. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Even when the act
of discrimination is covered by other statutes that require exhaustion of state remedies or
administrative pre-requisites, as does Title VII for example, these qualifications need not be
satisfied to state a claim under section 1981. Gibson v. Kroger Co., 506 F.2d 647 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975). Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1975);
Hill v. American Airlines, Inc., 479 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Brown v. General
Services Admin, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). (This case involved federal employees and thus is not
within the scope of this article). When, however, an action is dismissed for failure to meet
administrative pre-requisites of the statute relied on in the complaint, plaintiff cannot raise
the issue of section 1981 jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. Gibson v. Kroger Co., 506
F.2d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 1974).
95. Section 1981 is limited to redressing discrimination based upon race or alienage. See,
e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (racial discrimination);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage discrimination); Guerra v. Manchester
Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974) (alienage discrimination); Pusseisen v. Swarth-
more College, 71 F.R.D. 34, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (precluding coverage of sexual discrimination).
For an indexed listing of cases illustrating the scope of substantive protections of section
1981, see Interpretive Notes and Decisions, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
96. It is well settled that section 1981 creates a cause of action against private parties and
against federal, state and local governmental officials. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Assoc., Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (suit based upon private racial discrimination);
Baker v. F&F Investment Co., 489 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1973) (suit based upon discrimination
by federal officials); Black Bros. Combined, Inc. v. Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 147, 148-49 (E.D.
Va. 1974) (suit based upon discrimination by officials acting under color of state law).
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Although several courts have found the "person" restriction ap-
plicable,9' research has revealed only one case that gives reasons for
so holding. In Bennett v. Gravelle,5 the court reasoned as follows:
Sections 1981 and 1988, like 1983, were designed to hold individuals
liable for infringing upon another's civil rights. In 1871, when Con-
gress was debating the merits of section 1983, section 1981 had al-
ready been law for five years and had been repassed the previous year.
In its consideration of section 1983, Congress specifically rejected a
proposal to hold municipalities liable for the acts of its officials in
depriving persons of their civil rights. The reason for rejecting this
proposal was not that such liability already existed under section
1981, but that imposing this liability upon the community was an-
tagonistic to the basic policies of Congress ....
As clearly indicated in the legislative history, the primary purpose
of section 1983 was to provide a federal remedy otherwise unavailable
for asserting damages for deprivation of civil rights .... Accordingly,
an interpretation of section 1981 which authorizes damage actions
against states and municipalities deprives section 1983 of its essential
significance."
There is substantial and well reasoned authority holding to the
contrary.10 For example, Maybanks v. Ingraham,'0' citing but refut-
ing Gravelle reasoned thusly:
97. Arunga v. Weldon, 469 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1972) subsequently refuted by Sethy v.
Alameda Co. Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 1976); Maysonet v. Solis, 409 F.
Supp. 576, 580 (D. Puerto Rico 1975); Collum v. Yurkoviche, 409 F. Supp. 557, 558 (N.D. fl1.
1975); Redding v. Medica, 402 F. Supp. 1260, 1261(W.D. Pa. 1975); Richmond Black Police
Officers v. Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 153 (E.D. Va. 1974); Percy v. Brennan, 384 F. Supp.
800, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Boyden v. Troken, 358 F. Supp. 906, 907-08 (N.D. Il. 1973); Turner
v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963, 968 (D. Vt. 1972); Eddings v. Commonwealth, 311 F. Supp. 944,
945 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
98. 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971).
99. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
100. Sethy v. Alameda Co. Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 1976); Campbell
v. Gadsden County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650, 652-55 (5th Cir. 1976); Chavez-Salido v.
Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158, 163-64 (C.D. Calif. 1977); Gomez v. Pima County, 426 F. Supp.
816, 817-18 (D. Ariz. 1976); Raffety v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1045, 1050-51
(D. Md. 1976) (gives in depth analysis of law on point); Solin v. State Univ. of New York,
416 F. Supp. 536, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Chester County Police Dept., 294 F.
Supp. 1157, 1158-59 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
101. 378 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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In the first place, the word "person" which in § 1983 has been held
conclusively not to apply to municipalities, appears in § 1981 only to
describe those who are protected by the statute, not those who are
proscribed from its violation. In the second place, the scope and
application of § 1981 is vastly diferent from that of § 1983.
One essential difference is that § 1981, like § 1982, is based on and
intended to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, and applies, there-
fore, to actions against private persons as well as those acting under
color of law. Section 1983, on the other hand, enacted to implement
the Fourteenth Amendment and applying, therefore, only to cases
where state action is involved, is of more limited application ....
• . .Surely this is sensible, for if purely private citizens are subject
to liability under §§ 1981 and 1982, it would seem anamolous to
exempt government, the upholder of law, from similar responsibility
for racial discrimination. 0 2
The issue remains unresolved in most federal circuits. Therefore,
counsel should know, not only the arguments for each side,'03 and
when and how they are raised,'0 but he should also know the conse-
quences depending upon which way the issue is resolved.
There is no dispute that section 1981 supports a cause of action
by a private plaintiff against defendants in the private sector for
both injunctive relief and money damages.'0 5 Hence, if the
Maybanks construction prevails, holding the "person" requirement
inapplicable, the same relief should be available against the state
and local governing bodies, unless barred by the eleventh amend-
ment.'08
The Maybanks line of cases puts a gloss upon section 1981 which,
102. Id. at 916-17 (citations omitted).
103. Benett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971), argues in favor of imposing the"person" requirement upon section 1981. For extensive argument and authority to the con-
trary, see the cases cited in note 100 supra.
104. Plaintiff of course must name in the complaint the governmental entity sought to be
made party defendant. Defendant must raise the "person requirement" defense in his motion
to dismiss or it may be deemed waived. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
105. Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 235 (1969) which held that
both injunctive relief and damages were obtainable against a private party defendant under
section 1982 in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). See also, Baker v. F&F Investment
Co., 489 F.2d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 1973), which gives authoritative reasoning why section 1981
should be treated the same as section 1982 with respect to relief obtainable.
106. See text discussing eleventh amendment immunity Part II supra.
1977]
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read in light of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 07 arguably leads to the conclu-
sion that section 1981 abrogates the eleventh amendment immunity
to allow injunctive relief and money damages against the state.
Fitzpatrick found that in Title VII, passed pursuant to, and cloaked
with the authority of, the fourteenth amendment, congressional in-
tent to hold the state liable in back pay and attorneys' fees was
clearly present, therefore abrogating the eleventh amendment to
that extent. The logic of Fitzpatrick under the Maybanks construc-
tion, which may be read as creating, inter alia, a cause of action for
money damages against the state under section 1981, may be ex-
tended to section 1983 which, parallelling Title VII, was passed
pursuant to the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment.
To date, research indicates that only one of the Maybanks line of
cases involved suit against a state agency thus bringing the eleventh
amendment in issue.
In Wade v. Mississippi Co-op Extension Service, "I the court, rely-
ing on cases that held the section 1983 "person" requirement inappl-
icable to section 1981, concluded that state officials sued in their
official capacities were proper parties defendant in an action for
money damages under section 1981. The court further held that the
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,109 which provides
for attorneys' fees under section 1981, abrogated the eleventh
amendment immunity to the extent of allowing an award of attor-
neys' fees out of state funds despite the absence of express authori-
zation in the statute as Fitzpatrick, if read correctly, requires. In-
stead, the court relied upon what it termed "clear and unequivocal
legislative history" to allow for said fees against the state.
Ironically, the court also held that damages under section 1981
were barred by the eleventh amendment because similar legislative
107. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). But extending the holding of Fitzpatrick, a Title VII case, to
section 1981 may cause some unanticipated consequences. Included in the rights safeguarded
by section 1981 is protection against employment discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rail-
way Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). Thus, it not only overlaps the coverage
of Title VII, while avoiding the exhaustion requirements and administrative pre-requisites
thereof (see note 94 supra) but, under Fitzpatrick, it would also allow broader based dam-
ages (see note 105 supra) against the state than that allowed by Title VII. Such a result is
likely unintentional as it would appear to undermine the congressional intent present in Title
VII to limit relief against the state for employment discrimination to backpay and attorneys'
fees.
108. 424 F. Supp. 1242, 1255-57 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
109. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. 1977).
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intent was not present in the history of section 1981. Yet the cases
relied upon by Wade to find the "person" requirement inapplicable
suggest, as do the other cases in the Maybanks line, that the legisla-
tive history of section 1981 does indeed exhibit congressional intent
to hold the state, as well as private and federal defendants, liable
for money damages. In short, the question of whether damages
and/or attorneys' fees may be awarded against the state under the
Maybanks construction of section 1981, as with the question of the
viability of the Maybanks construction itself, cannot be definitively
answered.
If the Gravelle construction prevails, that is, if the "person" re-
quirement applies to section 1981 in suits redressing discrimination
under color of state law, the plaintiff will be left to the devices
available under section 1983 which would be a suit against the re-
sponsible officials for declaratory and injunctive relief and, when
bad faith is shown, for out of pocket compensatory and punitive
damages."' Also note that alternative avenues of relief such as other
antidiscrimination statutes with overlapping coverage"' and suits
directly under the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments should be
considered."'
Lastly, as mentioned, section 1981 is included in the Attorneys'
Fees Awards Act of 1976.111 Whether its inclusion allows for attor-
neys' fees against state and local governments depends on whether
the "person" requirement is deemed to apply to that section and on
the eleventh amendment considerations.14
B. Section 1982
Section 1982 is narrower in scope of substantive protections than
section 1981"1- but with regard to the matters discussed in this arti-
110. See text discussing damages under section 1983, Part I supra.
111. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (employment discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (housing
discrimination). But note that alternative statutes may contain qualifications to exacting
liability and obtaining relief that are not required under section 1981.
112. See text discussing suit directly under the Constitution, Part VI infra.
113. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. 1977).
114. See Wade v. Mississippi, 424 F. Supp. 1242,1254-56 (N.D. Miss. 1976) and discussion
in text thereon at note 108 supra. See also text discussing eleventh amendment, Part II supra.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) states:
19771
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cle these statutes are almost indistinguishable."' Because section
1982 protects against racial discrimination in the sale or lease of
property, there is overlap of coverage between this section and the
Fair Housing Act of 1968.117 Each statute, however, states an inde-
pendent cause of action and claims under one statute are neither
limited nor enhanced by the fact that they are also actionable under
the other statute.118
As true with section 1981, section 1982 read literally does not
disclose any restrictions as to who may be sued and as to what
remedies are available. Nevertheless, the cases cited with respect to
applicability of the "person" requirement to section 1981 suggest
that the considerations raised therein apply equally to section
1982.119 The discussion under section 1981 about damages, attor-
neys' fees and the eleventh amendment is likewise equally applica-
ble to section 1982.120
Finally, the statute of limitations under this section, as under
sections 1981, 1983 and 1985, is the controlling time period that
would ordinarily be the most appropriate one under state law.' 2
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
real and personal property.
As with section 1981, jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
Section 1982, like section 1983, protects against acts of racial discrimination committed by
private and state, as well as federal, defendants. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
440-44 (1968). But, unlike section 1981, section 1982's protection is limited to the area of
property rights.
116. For discussion of their common origin and consequent analogous construction see
Baker v. F&F Investment Co., 489 F.2d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 1973).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 to 3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Fair Housing Act, comparable
to Title VII, has exhaustion requirements and administrative prerequisites and time limita-
tions that are not required by suit under section 1982. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601, 3610(d) and
3612(a) (1970). This article does not attempt to exhaust the advantages and disadvantages
of suit under this section, thus further study in light of the considerations addressed herein
is well advised.
118. Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 1975); Morris v. Cizek, 503
F.2d 1303, 1304 (7th Cir. 1974); Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d 855, 857 (4th Cir. 1973). Cf.
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
119. See text of section 1981, Part IV A supra. See also League of United Latin Ameri-
can Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 908 (C.D. Calif. 1976).
120. See text and accompanying notes on section 1981, Part IV A supra.
121. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). See also text discuss-
ing section 1983 Part IV A supra.
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C. Sections 1985 and 1986
What has been said about nonsubstantive matters in suits under
section 1983 is generally true in suits under sections 198522 and
1986.13 These statutes use the word "person" in a context analogous
to that of section 1983 and, consequently, the courts have found that
the language invokes the same restrictions as to parties liable.'2 As
with section 1983, these statutes create independent causes of ac-
tion'2 without exhaustion requirements and unaffected by restric-
tions in statutes with overlapping coverage.' 21 The effects of the
eleventh amendment and sovereign and official immunities are es-
sentially the same.'1 Unlike section 1983, these statutes contain
express provision for damages, but damages are nevertheless obtain-
able under section 1983 and the distinction is of no apparent conse-
quence with regard to the availability of other types of relief.'28 Like
section 1983, the statute of limitations for section 1985 is deter-
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), deriving its authority from the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments, creates a federal cause of action to protect against conspiracies to interefere
with civil rights by either public or private persons. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 96 (1971). The jurisdictional bases for this statute are 28 U.S.C. § 1343(1) or § 1343(3) or
possibly § 1343(3) (1970). See Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress
Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 258, nn. 118-20, and accompanying text
(1977).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1970), having the same constitutional basis as section 1985, creates
a federal cause of action against responsible parties who have knowledge but through negli-
gence fail to prevent commission of a section 1985 conspiracy. The jurisdictional bases are
the same as in section 1985 referenced in the preceding note.
124. See Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1974); Weathers v. West Yuma
County School Dist., 387 F. Supp. 552, 555 (D. Colo. 1974); Black Bros. Combined, Inc. v.
City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1974); Veres v. County of Monroe, 364 F.
Supp. 1327, 1328 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Boyden v. Troken, 358 F. Supp. 906, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
125. Note, however, that an essential element of a cause of action under section 1986 is a
sufficiently established section 1985 violation. Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1370
(E.D. La. 1975). See Condosta v. Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 358, 363
(D. Vt. 1975); Johnston v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc, 356 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. N.Y. 1973).
126. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974); Hazzard v. Weinberger, 382 F. Supp.
225, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
127. See, e.g., Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Joseph, 463
F.2d 1046, 1048 (3rd Cir. 1972). Black Bros. Combined, Inc., v. City of Richmond, 386 F.
Supp. 147 (E.D. Va. 1974). See also Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1973).
128. E.g., Mizell v. North Broward Hospital Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970); Kletschka
v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 446 (2d Cir. 1969); Burch v. Carmody, 377 F. Supp. 1157, 1158 (E.D.
N.Y. 1974); Freeman & Bass, P.A. v. New Jersey Comm'n of Invest., 359 F. Supp. 1053 (D.
N.J. 1973).
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mined by reference to the limitation period of the forum state gov-
erning similar state claims. 2 ' Section 1986 contains an express limi-
tation period of one year'30 which will usually amount to a shorter
period than that allowed for a related claim under section 1985.
D. Section 1988
Section 1988 provides for application of the forum state's common
law and statutory remedies where those of the federal civil rights
statutes are inadequate. 3' This section is procedural only; it neither
confers jurisdiction nor creates rights in itself.3 2 Thus, once liability
and a right to relief is established, section 1988 permits utilization
of state remedies in absence of, or in conjunction with, federal reme-
dies, whichever best serves the policies expressed in the federal
statutes being enforced.'33 Although sections 1981 to 1988, with
minor exception, 34 make no express provision for relief, the Su-
preme Court in a section 1982 case concluded that "[t]he existence
of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appro-
priate remedies."'35 Hence, the law of the forum state, through sec-
tion 1988, may serve as a basis for awarding declaratory, injunctive,
compensatory and punitive remedies under these statutes.'36 Impor-
129. E.g., Peterson v. Fink, 515 F.2d 815, 816 (8th Cir. 1975).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1970) provides that "no action under the provisions of this section
shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has
accured." This incorporation presents a potential procedural pitfall. Normally under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the defendant must affirmatively plead the statute of limita-
tions in his motion to dismiss or else the defense is waived. Where the limitation period is
incorporated into the statute itself, however, it is said to affect the right rather than the
remedy and as such the plaintiff must plead in the complaint that he has brought suit within
the statutory period in order to state a claim under the statute. Of course, the court may
permit leave to amend the complaint in response to a motion to dismiss on this basis, but
with correct pleading plaintiff's counsel need not be caught in this embarrassing and poten-
tially prejudicial situation.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). This section, inter alia, applies to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983,
1985-1992, 1994 (1970). For a thorough discussion of its legislative history and purpose, see
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-707 (1973).
132. E.g., Barr v. United States, 478 F.2d 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 1973); Lamont v. Forman
Bros., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 912 (D.D.C. 1976).
133. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703 (1973).
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986 (1970) make express provision for damages.
135. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969).
136. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. 1977) has been amended to incorporate the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 allowing under certain civil rights statutes the prevailing
party, other than the United States, reasonable attorneys' fees. For a listing of the statutes
it covers and discussion of related issues, see text on eleventh amendment, Part II supra.
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tantly, however, section 1988 may not be used to circumvent limita-
tions upon liability and relief in derogation of either the express
wording or judicial construction of the statutes it is intended to
complement.'37
V. TITLE VII'18
Since Title V]i's sole function is to aid in the redress of certain
types of employment discrimination,'39 it is narrower in scope of
substantive protection than sections 1981 to 1988. As enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency Inc., ,",
Title VII did not repeal pre-existing remedies for discrimination in
private employment. As a result thereof, suits directly under the
Constitution' 4 ' and sections 1981 to 1988 may prove formidible alter-
natives even though their language does not expressly prohibit em-
ployment discrimination. 42
137. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 700-02 (1973) (Court refused use of section
1988 to circumvent the section 1983 "person" requirement by use of state law imposing
vicarious liability upon municipalities.)
138. Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970), and its 1972 amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp.
V 1975) make it unlawful for any employer, employment agency, labor organization or joint
labor-management committee to discriminate against any individual in hiring, discharging
or advertising jobs and in terms, conditions and privileges of employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. It also makes it unlawful for any one of the aforemen-
tioned persons, companies or agencies to discriminate against an employee or applicant for
employment because he opposed any practice made unlawful by the Act or because he tried
to enforce and secure his rights under the Act.
The 1972 amendments expanded the class of employers subject to Title VII. By modifying
the definitions of person, employer and employee, the 1972 amendments thus extended cover-
age of Title VII to the previously unprotected employees of state and local governments. In
actions involving such state and local governments and their employees, the federal enforce-
ment power was granted to the Department of Justice, rather than to the EEOC. The individ-
uals right to file a civil suit against an offending state employee, upon the Attorney General's
failure to do so, was nevertheless maintained. Thus, the 1972 amendments to Title VII
explicitly provide that a private individual may bring suit against a state employer in federal
court.
139. As stated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424
(1971), "[tjhe objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language
of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
which have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees." 401 U.S. at 429-30.
140. 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
141. See text Part VI infra.
142. The drafters of Title VII emphasized that it was not intended to be an exclusive
remedy, but rather was designed to supplement those remedies already at the disposal of an
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Under Title VII, however, the "person" problems regarding who
may be held liable are nonexistent; however, unlike these alterna-
tive statutes, Title VII requires the aggrieved party to comply with
a series of procedural prerequisites to bringing suit in federal
court. 43
A. Filing of Changes With the EEOC
To initiate the procedure either the potential plaintiff or a mem-
ber of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)44
must file a notice'45 of charges'40 with the Commission setting forth
aggrieved employee.
[T]he purpose of [the 1972 Amendments] is to correct certain deficiencies in title
VII and strengthen the national policy against employment discrimination. It is not
our purpose to repeal existing civil rights laws.
As originally passed in 1964, title VII provided an administrative procedure before
implementing the individual's right to sue directly in court under the constitutional
guarantees against discrimination. [The 1972 Amendments] corrects many of the
shortcomings of that original 1964 act, but it is an improvement which is premised on
the continued existence and vitality of other remedies for employment discrimination.
The law against employment discrimination did not begin with title VII and the
EEOC, nor is it intended to end with it.
118 CONG. REc. 3371 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams).
143. Although Title VII actions must be brought in the appropriate U.S. District Court,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Supp. V 1975), it is important to note that a potential Title VII
case rarely commences at the EEOC level. Generally, if the individual's home state or locality
has a law prohibiting the alleged discriminatory practice, the individual must file a charge
there first. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975). Sixty days after filing with the state or
locality, but not less than 180 days after the alleged violation, the individual may then file a
charge under Title VII with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (e) (Supp. V 1975).
144. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission is an executive agency empow-
ered to prevent the occurrence of discriminatory employment practices. EEO Act of 1972, §
4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
145. Title VII requires that the charge be "in writing under oath." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(Supp. V 1975). The requirement of "a writing under oath" is treated as procedural; the
original "complaint" is often simply an unsworn letter setting out the complainant's griev-
ance, but the EEOC regulations allow technical defects in the charge to be remedied by
amendment relating back to the date of the original charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (1976). The
plaintiff can verify or add to his statements at a later time and preserve the filing date of his
original charge.
146. A rule of construction has developed that a party defendant to a suit under this section
against whom no charge has previously been filed with the Commission cannot be held liable
for any damages resulting from the discrimination. Le Beau v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 484
F.2d 798, 799 (7th Cir. 1973) (international union not named in charge and not appearing
before the EEOC was properly dismissed as defendant); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416
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the alleged violation ' within 180 days of the alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice.' The EEOC then has a period of 10 days in
which they must serve notice of these charges upon the employer or
agency.' Thereafter, where practicable, the EEOC must investi-
gate and determine within 180 days of filing whether or not there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charges are true. '
This 180 day filing requirement is in many instances the albatross
of what could be a very strong Title VII action as it is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to filing suit in the federal court.'5 ' State statutes of
F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969); Scott v. Univ. of Delaware, 385 F. Supp. 937, 941 (D. Del. 1974);
Jamison v. Olga Cool Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 460-61 (S.D. W. Va. 1971). The above rule is
designed to insure that the charged party is timely notified for the further purpose of encour-
aging conciliation and voluntary settlement of disputes. In Scott v. Univ. of Del., 385 F. Supp.
937 (D. Del. 1974), only the University was named in the EEOC charge and the court accord-
ingly found that the University officials could not be sued with respect to the Title VII claim.
The court was quick to point out, however, that this was not a harsh result as the officials
were proper parties under other statutes upon which the plaintiff was basing his suit. There
are, however, authorities holding contra to the above rule. For instance, an unnamed party
was not dismissed where he had actual notice of the charge. Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel,
503 F.2d 177, 182-83 (App. D.C. 1974). Other cases have held that where there is "substantial
identity" between the charged party and the unnamed party the court will find jurisdiction
over both, reasoning that this comports with the judicial policy of liberally construing section
2000e-5(e). Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957, 964 (D. Md. 1973) (court
had jurisdiction over members of committee though not before EEOC as such); McDonald
v. American Federation of Musicians, 308 F. Supp. 664, 669 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (recording
secretary of local union was proper party where the union was named in the EEOC charge).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975).
148. Id. In the case of federal employees, the notice must be filed within 30 days of the
alleged violation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (d), (Supp. V 1975).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975). If the EEOC has not secured a conciliation
agreement within 30 days after the charge has been filed, the EEOC may file an action in
the appropriate District Court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1970). The likelihood, however, of the EEOC securing such an agreement in 30
days is highly unlikely. If no action has been filed by the EEOC and no conciliation agreement
has been entered into 180 days after the charge has been filed, the charging party may request
a notice of right-to-sue. Id. Otherwise notice is not issued until a dispositive decision has been
reached on the case: i.e., there has been a finding of no reasonable cause, conciliation efforts
have failed, or a decision has been made not to file suit. Most courts have upheld the EEOC
regulations on the rationale that the charging party would otherwise be forced to choose
between filing a private suit immediatly, perhaps missing the chance to conciliate the case,
and waiting for a possible EEOC-instituted suit at a later date.
151. See, e.g., Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 519 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1975); East v.
Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1975); Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodyn-
amic, Div. of FMC Corp., 456 F.2d 1359, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1972).
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limitations are not applicable since there are limitations specifically
enumerated within the Act.1 2
The requirement that notice must be filed within 180 days of the
alleged unlawful employment practice may be circumvented if the
alleged discriminatory practice is continuing in nature.53 Courts
have held that failure to file charges with the EEOC within the 180
day period in situations involving a continuing violation will not bar
a subsequent suit in federal court unless the charge was not filed
within 180 days after the employer terminated the challenged prac-
tice. 14 Even though an employee has been discriminated against in
his employment and even if said discrimination is continuing in
nature, once employment is terminated the employee cannot serve
notice beyond 180 days. 5 Similarly, termination of employment
152. Beckum v. Tennessee Hotel, 341 F. Supp. 991, 994 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
153. Discriminatory failure to promote constitutes a continuing violation of Title VII: Rich
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975); Claims concerning denial of
equal pay for equal work constitute a continuing violation of Title VII: Dudley v. Textron,
Inc. Burkart-Randall Div., 386 F. Supp. 602, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Discrimination surrounding
the allocation of insurance benefits is a continuing violation: EEOC v. Rinella, 401 F. Supp.
175, 183 (N.D. Il1. 1975); Termination of employment either through discharge or resignation
is not a continuing violation: Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 519 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1975).
154. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1971); Kinnan v.
Central Teletel Co., 401 F. Supp. 1273, 1274 (W.D. Va. 1975).
155. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 97 S. Ct. 1885 (1977), the Supreme Court was
confronted with a female air flight attendant who had failed to file a timely claim against
the airline for violation of Title VI when her employment was terminated in 1968 pursuant
to a later invalidated policy which required termination of her employment because she got
married. The Court held that petitioner, United Air Lines, had not committed a present,
continuing violation of title VII by refusing to credit respondent, after rehiring her in 1972,
with pre-1972 seniority absent any allegation that petitioner's seniority system discriminated
against former female employees or victims of past discrimination. In enunciating its holding,
the Court stated the following:
Respondent is correct in pointing out that the seniority system gives present effect
to a past act of discrimination. But United was entitled to treat that past act as lawful
after respondent failed to file a charge of discrimination within the 90 days then
allowed by § 706(d). A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely
charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute
was passed. It may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which
the status of a current practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an
unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.
Respondent emphasizes the fact that she has alleged a continuing violation. United's
seniority system does indeed have a continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits.
But the emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is
whether any present violation exists. She has not alleged that the system discriminates
against former female employees or that it treats former employees who were dis-
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either through discharge or resignation is not in itself a continuing
violation."6
An argument can be made that equitable modifications such as
tolling and estoppel apply to the 180 day time requirement so that
the limitation period does not begin to run until the facts supporting
a discrimination charge are apparent or should be apparent to a
person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly
situated to plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals so held in
Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc.57 in which it stated
that the 180 day period within which charges must be filed with the
EEOC is not jurisdictional in the sense that compliance with it vel
non determines the jurisdiction of the district court without respect
to other circumstances. The court also held that where the em-
ployer is charged with actively seeking to mislead the plaintiff as to
the facts supporting a charge of discrimination, the ninety day pe-
riod did not begin to run until the facts that would support a charge
of discrimination became, or should have become, apparent.,"
Even though an aggrieved party has not filed charges with the
EEOC or, in the alternative failed to file within the statutory period,
he will still be able to participate in a class action'59 and recover, so
long as some member of his injured class made the charge common
to all and thus gave notice to the EEOC and the defendant so that
voluntary compliance and conciliation functions could be at-
tempted.' The named plaintiffs, however, must have filed charges
within the statutory period and cannot represent those persons who
could not have filed a charge with the EEOC at the time plaintiffs
filed their charges. 6'
charged for a discriminatory reason any differently than former employees who re-
signed or were discharged for a non-discriminatory reason. In short, the system is
neutral in its operation.
Id. at 1889.
156. Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 519 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1975).
157. 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
158. Id. at 930.
159. For procedural problems involved in class action suits under Title VII, see Smalls,
Class Actions Under Title VII: Some Current Procedural Problems, 25 AM. U. L. REv. 821
(1976).
160. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1361, 1367-68 (E.D. Va. 1975).
161. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975).
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B. Filing Suit in the Federal Court
Once the aggrieved party has properly filed with the EEOC, he
must obtain a right-to-sue letter prior to filing suit in the federal
court. "'2 If after investigation the EEOC determines that there is no
reasonable cause to believe that the charges are true, they must be
dismissed and both the employer and the aggrieved party notified. 3
This notification to the plaintiff constitutes his right-to-sue letter. 4
Conversely, if the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that the
charges are true, then it is to make every effort to eliminate the
unlawful practice by informal methods of conferences, conciliation
and persuasion. 68 The EEOC is empowered to bring suit itself
against the employer if it is unable to obtain voluntary compliance
with the law.'
When the employer is a governmental or political entity, the
EEOC must refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring
suit.' 7 The potential plaintiff or plaintiffs aggrieved may intervene
as of right in any suit brought by the EEOC or the Attorney Gen-
eral. '6 If neither the EEOC nor the Attorney General decides to
bring suit, the aggrieved party must then be notified by letter of his
right to bring suit.' This is true even if the charges were filed by a
member of the EEOC. Once the right-to-sue letter is issued by the
EEOC, the aggrieved party then has 90 days within which to file his
complaint in federal court.17
The courts are divided on the issue of when the 90 day period
begins to run. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
when the EEOC has made a determination of no reasonable cause,
the limitation period begins to run when the EEOC notifies the
plaintiff of its dismissal of the charge. Hence, an EEOC regulation
which provided that plaintiff could request after notification of dis-
missal a notice of right-to-sue was invalid to the extent that it had
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp V 1975).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
164. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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the effect of extending the 90 days indefinitely until the aggrieved
party requested the notice of right-to-sue. 7 1 The Eighth Circuit is
in direct conflict, however, as it has held that the 90 day period
would begin to run upon official notification to the complainant
after determination by EEOC not to file suit. Thus, according to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, where the first letter from
the EEOC advised the plaintiff that conciliation had failed, but not
that the Commission had decided not to file suit, it did not consti-
tute statutory notice initiating the 90 day period. The court went
on to say that even if the statute could be considered to require the
issuance of a notice of a right-to-sue upon the failure of conciliation,
the aggrieved party is entitled to actual and effective notification
of his right-to-sue. Thus, where the first letter explicitly informed
the plaintiff that the 90 day period would not begin to run until
receipt of a second letter at the plaintiff's request, the first letter was
not effective notification and could not serve to initiate the running
of the limitation period. 2 Several district courts have been in agree-
ment with the Second Circuit, however, in holding that the 90 day
period commences with notice of failure to conciliate, despite mis-
leading advice from the EEOC that the time period would not begin
to run until receipt of the requested notice of right-to-sue.7 3
C. Alternative Jurisdictional Considerations
As stated earlier, sections 1981 to 1988 may prove to be formidible
alternatives to Title VII. Additionally, the aggrieved party should
consider pleading pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act 7 4 as
well as directly under the Constitution. Different considerations
come into play, however, when deciding under which jurisdictional
ground to proceed.
171. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2nd Cir.), on rehearing, 520 F.2d 409
(2d Cir. 1975).
172. Tuff v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975).
173. See, e.g., Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Turner v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp.,
399 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
174. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 202 to 216 (Supp. V 1975). Additionally, if age discrimination is the subject of the
complaint, plaintiff may independently sue under the Age Discrimination Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (1970 & Supp V 1975).
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An aggrieved party may be time barred from seeking redress pur-
suant to Title VII if the 180 day period for filing charges with the
EEOC or the 90 day period for filing suit in the federal court has
expired. He may still have time to proceed under the Civil Rights
statutes, however, as a cause of action thereunder runs as long as
the applicable state statute of limitations which is normally a num-
ber of years.175
The remedy sought by the aggrieved party is an important consid-
eration. Punitive damages are recoverable under the Civil Rights
Act while Title VII plaintiffs are normally limited to backpay
awards and attorneys' fees. 171
Another consideration is the different burdens complaining par-
ties must satisfy depending upon the constitutional or statutory
provision under which they proceed. An aggrieved party suing pur-
suant to Title VII must merely show a discriminatory impact. 17  It
is not necessary to prove discriminatory intent as good faith and
lack of discriminatory intent are, for the most part, useless concepts
in a Title VII lawsuit. Policies and practices, neutral on their face
and implemented without discriminatory intent, are nevertheless
subject to scrutiny by the courts under Title VII.1 78 The measure
175. No federal statute of limitations exists regarding the Civil Rights Act; hence, the
period of limitations is governed by the period set forth in the most analogous state action.
176. The Supreme Court in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), stated
that the remedy of back pay, given a finding of unlawful discrimination, should be withheld
only if its award would frustrate Title VII's central purpose of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and that the absence of bad faith is not a sufficient reason for
denying back pay. However, "back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two
years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp V
1975). It is important to note that Title VII abrogates the eleventh amendment to the extent
of allowing back pay and attorneys' fees. See text Part II supra. For an in-depth analysis of
seeking redress for employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Acts, see Brooks, Use
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 258 (1977).
177. See 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 209 (1976).
178. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), black employees of the Duke Power
Company brought a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina against their employer, alleging that Duke Power, by requiring a high school di-
ploma and a satisfactory score on a standardized intelligence test for promotion to certain
jobs heretofore limited to white employees, violated Title VII. The District Court dismissed
their complaint. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in part
the lower court's dismissal and held that six black employees hired prior to the adoption of
the high school diploma requirement were entitled to injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit
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that is applied is whether or not those neutral policies and practices
have the consequence or the effect of discriminating on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin or religion. If the policy or practice
has a disparate impact on a protected Title VII class, that policy or
practice is in violation of Title VII and can be voided on the court's
order.
While the showing of a discriminatory impact is sufficient to es-
tablish a prima facie case'17 under Title VII, the Supreme Court has
declined to permit an aggrieved party redress for a claim of employ-
ment discrimination when proceeding directly under the Constitu-
tion unless the discriminatory impact is accompanied by proof of
discriminatory intent. In Washington v. Davis,8"' the Supreme
Court denied a constitutional cause of action based solely on claims
of discriminatory impact and lack of job-relatedness against the
questioned employment test. Although it rejected the constitutional
held, however, that employment testing need not be job related, provided that such tests not
be designed, intended or used to discriminate against minority employees. The Supreme
Court reversed. The Court held that the requirements for promotion established by the Duke
Power Company violated Title VII because neither standard utilized by Duke was shown-to
be significantly related to successful job performance, both requirements operated to exclude
black employees at a substantially higher rate than white aspirants for promotion, and the
jobs in question previously had been filled only by white employees pursuant to a long
standing policy of preferential treatment for white employees.
The significance of Duke Power lay in the Court's determination that practices, procedures,
or tests, though neutral on their face and neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
such practices operate to perpetuate the effects of past practices of discrimination. "Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation." Id. at 432.
179. Once a complaint is filed in the district court the aggrieved plaintiff need only estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination to shift the burden of proof to the employer. Estab-
lishing a prima facie case is normally accomplished through the use of three basic types of
statistics. They are demographic, concentration and comparative statistics. Demographic
statistics compare the composition of the work force to the population at large. Concentration
statistics are a measure of the numerical balance of protected class members, vis-A-vis other
employees, as they are distributed throughout the organization. An activity's overall demo-
graphic statistics come into focus when both the demographic and concentration statistics
appear satisfactory. Comparative statistics are essentially a measure of the rate at which
employees of various and different classes are able to take advantage of the benefits of an
employment situation. For example, if 30 percent of the applicants for promotion opportuni-
ties are qualified blacks, promotions should reflect a rate of 30 percent blacks. Any one of
these statistical analyses can establish a prima facie case; however, if the plaintiff can show
a disparity through the use of more than one of these analyses, the employer's burden of proof
becomes much heavier.
180. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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claim that the employment test violated the respondents' rights
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the high Court
did not say that a disproportionate impact alone could never form
the basis of such a claim. The Court stated that where the relevant
facts, in their totality, infer an invidious discriminatory purpose
that cannot be explained on nonracial grounds, a claim based on the
violation of constitutional rights may be justified. While, as the
concurring opinion points out, the line between discriminatory pur-
pose and discriminatory impact may not be clear or very critical in
every situation, this decision indicates an intent to restrict the test-
ing of claims to Title VII standards.
Lastly, although beyond the scope of this article, it is noteworthy
that if the aggrieved party is a federal employee, he is limited to
Title VII in seeking redress for employment discrimination. The
Supreme Court, in Brown v. General Services Administration,""1
ruled that section 717 of he Equal Employment Opportunities Act
of 197212 constitutes the exclusive individual remedy for job-related
racial discrimination against federal employees. 83
VI. SUIT DIRECTLY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The various acts of Congress passed pursuant to the fourteenth
(and thirteenth) amendment contain several qualifications which
limit the exacting of liability and the obtaining of relief. Among the
181. 425 U.S. 820 (1976). In Brown, a federal employee sought review in a federal court 42
days after receipt of a final adverse decision of the Civil Service Commission on his race
discrimination in employment claim, for which he had based jurisdiction on Title VII and
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 to 2202 (1970). The district court dismissed
the action for failure to file within the statutory period (then 30 days). The Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, holding that Section 717 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for
federal employment discrimination. The Second Circuit also ruled that if Section 717 did not
pre-empt other remedies, then the federal employee's complaint was still properly dismissed
because of his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. In affirming, the Supreme
Court pointed to the Senate and House Committee Reports and to remarks of Senator Cran-
ston and Senator Williams which collectively expressed a belief that the 1972 Amendments
would, for the first time, give federal employees the right to sue the federal government for
employment discrimination.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975).
183. But see text infra Part VI regarding suing directly under the Constitution. Notwith-
standing the Brown decision it is conceivable that federal employees may still be able to
obtain immediate relief by suing directly under the Constitution in cases of employment
discrimination.
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qualifications of significant consequence are, for example, the"person" requirement of section 198384 and the administrative pre-
requisites of Title VII.' Theoretically, by filing suit directly under
the fourteenth amendment, in lieu of relying on the statutes passed
pursuant thereto, these and other statutory qualifications would be
avoided. The only remaining limitations, therefore, would be those
found in the Constitution itself. Such limitations include the elev-
enth amendment immunity and article H of the Constitution re-
garding judicial authority and, by virtue of federal statute, limita-
tions on the jurisdiction of federal courts.'86 This theoretical concern
has arisen in a number of recent federal court cases wherein various
local governmental entities charged with violating section 1983, but
unreachable thereunder, were alternatively sued directly under the
fourteenth amendment. The decisions have been inconsistent and
conflicting.' 81
A. The Biven's Doctrine
The genesis of the disarray is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Federal Narcotics Agents. 9 Bivens was an action for damages filed
184. See Part IlI supra.
185. See Part V supra.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
187. Among the more recent cases refusing, for various reasons, circumvention of the "per-
son" requirement of section 1983 by suit directly under the fourteenth amendment are:
Raffety v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Md. 1976) (provides an excellent
comprehensive review of the issue); Livingood v. Townsend, 422 F. Supp. 24 (D. Minn. 1976)
(concluding section 1983 to be exclusive remedy); Farnsworth v. Orem City, 421 F. Supp. 830
(C.D. Utah 1976); Pitrone v. Mercadante, 420 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (also gives an
excellent review of the issue from perspective that fourteenth amendment does not in itself
create a cause of action); Mejia v. School City of Gary, 415 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1976);
Clipper v. City of Tacoma Park, Civ. No. 73-295-B (D. Md. Mar. 25, 1975); Jamison v.
McCurrie, 388 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223 (D.
Conn. 1974). Recent cases allowing avoidance of the person requirement via suit for money
damages directly under the fourteenth amendment include: Wiley v. Memphis Police Dept.,
548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Staunton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975); Brault v. Town
of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College, 523 F.2d 569 (7th
Cir. 1975); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1976); Calvin v. Conlisk, 520
F.2d I (7th Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803 (9th
Cir. 1975); Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Sedule v. Capital
School Dist., 425 F. Supp. 552 (D. Del. 1976); Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp.
402 (S.D. N.Y. 1976) (gives well reasoned analysis of issue supported by substantial author-
ity); Tucker v. Thompson, 421 F. Supp. 297 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Town-
ship of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D. N.J. 1976).
188. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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in federal court against federal narcotics agents by a private plain-
tiff who alleged unconstitutional conduct in connection with the
search, arrest and interrogation of the plaintiff. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court held that a violation of the fourth amendment's
command against unreasonable search and seizures, by a federal
agent acting under color of federal authority, gave rise to a federal
cause of action within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)' 9 for both
equitable relief and money damages.
Mr. Justice Brennan in delivering the majority opinion stated:
Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide
for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the conse-
quences of its violation. But "it is ... well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done. . . ." The present case in-
volves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of af-
firmative action by Congress. . . . [We have here no explicit con-
gressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from
189. The Constitution itself does not invoke federal jurisdiction. Congress determines the
jurisdiction of the federal courts through enabling statutes. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a) and 1343
(1970) are, inter alia, the bases of jurisdiction for civil rights matters.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) states "district courts shall have original jurisdiction for all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000. . . and arises
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) reads in pertinent part, "the district court shall have original
jurisdiction over any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . (3)
[tlo redress the deprivation under color of any State law . . . of any right . . . secured by
the Constitution . . . or by Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens . . . [and]
(4) [tlo recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights .. "
Section 1331(a) clearly invokes federal jurisdiction for suit brought directly under the
Constitution providing the jurisdictional amount be met. Section 1343(4) clearly invokes
federal question jurisdiction under the civil rights statutes. There has been some scholarly
and judicial debate as to the effect of section 1343(3). It appears to invoke federal jurisdiction
in suits filed directly under the Constitution as well as under the civil rights statutes. If this
reading is correct, in suits filed directly under the Constitution to redrese deprivations of civil
rights, the jurisdictional amount requirement of section 1331(a) could be avoided. The weight
of authority appears to hold contra, but the question has not been definitively decided. A good
starting point for study of the issue can be found in Comment, Implying a Damage Remedy
Against Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Congressional Action as
an Obstacle to Extension of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 MD. L. REv. 123, 126, n.19 (1976).
(hereinafter referred to as Implying a Damage Remedy].
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the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally
effective in the view of Congress.'90
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan explained fully when
an award of money damages should be considered by the courts in
cases analogous to Bivens:
To be sure, "it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great
a degree as the courts. . ." But it must also be recognized that the
Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the
individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative
majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to
await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief
with regard to these legal interests than with respect to interests
protected by federal statutes.
The question, then, is, as I see it, whether compensatory relief is
"necessary" or "appropriate" to the vindication of the interest
asserted . . . In resolving that question, it seems to me that the
range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least
as broad as the range a legislature would consider with respect to an
express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy .... "I
B. Section 1983 v. Fourteenth Amendment: Case Still Pending
In Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,192 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to decide whether
the restrictions of section 1983 apply to a suit invoking federal juris-
diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and alleging a cause of
action for injunctive relief and money damages directly under the
fourteenth amendment.'93 The Court reserved judgment but the
opinion was nevertheless instructive. Plaintiff, an untenured
teacher whose contract was not renewed, sued the County School
Board for damages and reinstatement alleging, inter alia, violation
190. 403 U.S. at 396-97.
191. 403 U.S. at 407 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
192. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
193. Prior to Mount Healthy, the Supreme Court alluded to the propriety of avoiding the
section 1983 "person" requirement by going the section 1331(a) route in City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). The Court reserved the question of whether the lower court had
jurisdiction against a municipality under section 1331(a) in conjunction with the fourteenth
amendment until the trial court established whether the jurisdictional amount was met.
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of his fourteenth amendment rights. The district court rested its
jurisdiction solely on section 1331(a). The Board contended that
since the substance of the suit is covered by section 1983 the statu-
tory restrictions thereof should apply regardless of the jurisdictional
basis of the suit. The Court held, however, that when a suit is
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, "jurisdiction is sufficiently estab-
lished by allegation of a claim under the Constitution or federal
statutes."'94
The Court affirmed and extended Bivens insofar as holding that
section 1331(a) invokes federal jurisdiction to hear cases directly
under the fourteenth as well as the fourth amendment. In line with
Bivens, it further established that notwithstanding countervailing
considerations such as section 1983, there are no inherent proce-
dural or jurisdictional prohibitions to permitting a federal cause of
action directly under the fourteenth amendment by a private plain-
tiff seeking equitable relief and money damages. Hence, although
Mount Healthy did not answer the issue presented, it did clarify and
narrow its framework by holding, and thus eliminating from consid-
eration, the following: (1) whether section 1331(a) provides a juris-
194. The Court's reasoning was as follows:
The Board has raised this question for the first time in a document filed after its
reply brief in this Court. Were it in truth a contention that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction, we would be obliged to consider it, even as we are obliged to inquire sua
sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction . . . . And if
this were a § 1983 action, brought under the special jurisdictional provision of 28
U.S.C. § 1343 which requires no amount in controversy, it would be appropriate for
this Court to inquire, for jurisdictional purposes, whether a statutory action had in fact
been alleged . . . . However, where an action is brought under § 1331, the catch-all
federal question provision requiring $10,000 in controversy, jurisdiction is sufficiently
established by allegation of a claim under the Constitution or federal statutes, unless
it "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction .... Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, (1946) ....
Here respondent alleges that the Board had violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and claimed the jurisdictionally necessary amount of dam-
ages. The claim that the Board is a "person" under § 1983, even assuming the correct-
ness of the Board's argument that the § 1331 action is limited by the restrictions of §
1983, is not so patently without merit as to fail the test of Bell v. Hood, supra. There-
fore, the question as to whether the respondent stated a claim for relief under § 1331
is not of the jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own motion. The related
question of whether a school district is a person for purposes of § 1983 is likewise not
before us. We leave those questions for another day, and assume, without deciding,
that the respondent could sue under § 1331 without regard to the limitations imposed
by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . ..
429 U.S. at 278-79.
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dictional basis for federal suits filed directly under the fourteenth
amendment; (2) whether the fourteenth amendment provides a sub-
stantive basis for a federal cause of action; and (3) whether federal
courts have inherent power to provide equitable relief and money
damages to vindicate interests protected thereunder.
In view of Mount Healthy the issue which remains unresolved is:
what effect do the restrictions of statutes passed pursuant to the
enforcement clause of the fourteenth (and analogously the thir-
teenth) 95 amendment have upon suits filed directly thereunder?
To reiterate, a number of federal courts have grappled with this
issue and decisions have come down on both sides, most drawing
heavily on Bivens. The test to be applied in weighing the opposing
considerations is uncertain. The "necessary and appropriate" lan-
guage of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens has been
adopted by some of the courts.199
Among the arguments advanced for engrafting the restrictions of
section 1983 upon a federal suit filed directly under the fourteenth
amendment are as follows: section 1983, as construed by the United
States Supreme Court,'97 focusing on the legislative history,"9 ' estab-
lishes "affirmative action" by Congress to preclude state and local
governmental entities from liability for violations of section 1983.
Bivens says that such action is a factor counseling against fashion-
ing independent judicial remedies. Further, the Supreme Court has
twice found that this preclusion from liability could not be circum-
195. The issue above also has relevance to what effect restrictions of statutes passed pur-
suant to the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment have upon suits filed directly
thereunder; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (1970), for example, are based upon the thirteenth
amendment and there is a split of authority as to whether the "person" requirement of section
1983 applies to suits under these sections. See Part IV supra. Unless this issue is definitively
resolved in the negative, the question of whether the restrictions of these statutes apply to
suits filed directly under the thirteenth amendment will continue to have practical signifi-
cance.
196. E.g., Raffety v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Md. 1976); Clipper v.
City of Tacoma Park, Civ. No. 73-295-B (D. Md. March 25, 1975).
197. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (municipality not person within meaning of
section 1983); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 963 (1973) (counties, like municipalities
are nonpersons); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (nonperson status applies to
suits for either equitable relief or damages).
198. The Supreme Court interpreted the legislative history as indicating an intent to pro-
tect political subdivisions of the state from having their coffers depleted by civil rights actions
for money damages.
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vented. In Moor v. County of Alameda'99 the Court refused to allow
use of section 1988, which provides, inter alia, for supplementing
relief under section 1983 with common law remedies from the forum
state, to avoid section 1983's "person" requirement and exact dam-
age from the county. Similarly, in Aldinger v. Howard,"' the Court
refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction in connection with a section
1983 claim, over a state governmental entity regarding a state law
claim wherein damages were obtainable, reasoning that to do so
would subvert congressional intent in enacting section 1983.
Section 1983 was passed pursuant to the enforcement clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Although Mount Healthy dispells the
notion that Congress, by virtue of the enforcement clause, is the
exclusive agent by which a cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment may be created, it nevertheless suggests that the courts
should give special deference when Congress acts pursuant there-
to,20' particularly when lack of deference would substantially un-
dermine the legislation . 2 Allowing suit for money damages directly
199. 411 U.S. 963 (1973).
200. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). Prior to Aldinger several federal courts in section 1983 actions
permitted circumvention of the person requirement by making governmental entities parties
defendant against state law claims brought into federal court in connection with the section
1983 claim on the basis of pendent jurisdiction. E.g., Redding v. Medica, 402 F. Supp. 1260
(W.D. Pa. 1975).
In deference to congressional intent respecting the coverage of section 1983 the Court in
Aldinger foreclosed this route:
Parties such as counties, whom Congress excluded from liability in § 1983, and there-
fore by reference in the grant of jurisdiction under § 1343(3), can argue with a great
deal of force that the scope of that "civil action" over which the district courts have
been given statutory jurisdiction should not be so broadly read as to bring them back
within that power merely because-the facts also give rise to an ordinary civil action
against them under state law. In short, as against a plaintiff's claim of additional
power over a "pendent party," the reach of the statute conferring jurisdiction should
be construed in light of the scope of the cause of action as to which federal judicial
power has been extended by Congress.
427 U.S. at 17.
201. This is in keeping with the more general principle that when judicial action is directed
toward the fashioning of constitutional common law rather than true constitutional decisions,
deference to the superior policy making decision of Congress is appropriate. Implying a
Damage Remedy note 189, supra at 141.
202. When Congress acts pursuant to the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment
to carry out its objectives, it dictates that the judiciary should give special deference to
legislation that results from this constitutional mandate. This is not to say that every facet
of such legislation, particularly restrictions as to liability or relief, attains the level of consti-
tutional law.
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under the fourteenth amendment would render section 1983 mean-
ingless except to the extent of the jurisdictional amount require-
ment of section 1331(a) and even this may be but a surreptitious
saving factor." 3
Deference to state authority is also pertinent. The doctrines of
federalism and comity come into play and weigh against the pro-
priety of federal courts exacting damages from state or local govern-
mental entities.204
But what about Bivens? To begin with, Bivens came under the
fourth amendment which has no clause delegating its enforcement
to Congress. Bivens involved federal agents which precluded the
considerations of federalism and comity. In Bivens there was no
affirmative action by Congress, and there was no effective statutory
remedy to redress the abridgment of clearly established fourth
amendment rights. 0 The Court also found that state tort law reme-
dies were inadequate. 26 Contrawise, section 1983 arguably provides
affirmative and effective relief for fourteenth amendment viola-
tions. Declaratory and injunctive relief20 7 and, if bad faith is shown,
out of pocket compensatory and punitive damages0 ' are obtainable
through the responsible governmental officials. Further, the erosion
of sovereign immunity at the state and local levels has made dam-
age remedies in state courts widely available in discrimination
cases.20 9
Arguments have been advanced for the position that money dam-
ages are awardable against state and local governmental entities in
a federal suit directly under the fourteenth amendment regardless
of statutory restrictions to the contrary. In Bivens, the Court did
affirm earlier precedent that "it is . . .well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a gen-
eral right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any avail-
203. See note 187 supra, and accompanying text.
204. The significance of these concepts is well summarized in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).
205. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
206. Id. at 391.
207. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
208. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
209. See Generally K. DAvIs, ADM ISTRATwE LAW TExT § 25 (3rd ed. 1972).
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able remedy to make good the wrong done."""0 Further, the immun-
ity of state and local governmental entities, as noted, is not explicit
in section 1983 but was construed by the Supreme Court through
interpretation of the statute's legislative history. Even assuming the
Court's historical interpretation to be correct, its present relevance
has been discredited by at least one court."
Perhaps the most convincing argument against engrafting the
restrictions of section 1983 upon the fourteenth amendment is the
dicta in the Supreme Court decision of Katzenback v. Morgan,2 12
which held that Congress should not have the power to foreclose a
direct remedy for damages under the fourteenth amendment by
enacting a statute whose restrictions in effect supercede and thereby
limit remedies otherwise available for effective vindication of con-
stitutional rights. The Court in Katzenback emphasized that sec-
tion 5 of the fourteenth amendment is only affirmative in nature
and cannot be used to dilute equal protection and due process deci-
sions of the judiciary. As Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinion
of the Court, stated, "Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopt-
ing measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate or dilute these guar-
antees."21'
C. Ramifications and Practical Effects of the Present Posture
of the Law
No matter which way the issue is resolved, its ramifications and
practical effects upon liability and relief in federal suits by private
plaintiffs alleging discrimination under color of state law will be
significant and far reaching. If filing suit directly under the four-
210. 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971), quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
211. Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). It is notewor-
thy that entities which would be considered nonpersons under section 1983 are nevertheless
subject to liabiltiy and damages under other civil rights statutes. For example, back pay is
allowed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. V 1975) and
according to some courts, damages are allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982 (1970).
See Part IV supra. This would appear inconsistent with the reasoning as indicated in the
legislative history of section 1983, to financially protect such entities. Perhaps this is sugges-
tive of the larger problem of lack of comprehensive consideration of this area of the law either
by Congress or by the courts.
212. 384 U.S. 641 (1968).
213. Id. 651, n.10 (emphasis added).
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teenth amendment may be utilized to avoid the "person" require-
ment of section 1983, theoretically, the same means may be em-
ployed to avoid restrictions of other civil rights statutes whose
source of authority is the Constitution.. Perhaps this approach may
be undertaken by plaintiffs in federal suits on a statute by statute
basis urging that if the relief sought is "necessary and appropriate,"
as suggested in Bivens, statutory restrictions to the contrary may be
ignored. To be sure, such a piecemeal approach, controlled by the
exigencies of the particular cases, would dictate against comprehen-
sive and definitive consideration of the issue, thus prolonging the
uncertainty and confusion over the utility of the civil rights statutes.
If the various statutory restrictions were to be engrafted upon suits
filed directly under the fourteenth amendment a problem may arise
as to which restrictions are applicable. Discriminatory conduct may
create various statutory causes of action having incongruous restric-
tions.214 It appears that anything short of comprehensive re-
evaluation of this area of law will fall short of establishing consist-
ency and clarity.
Of practical significance, the controversy has focused on the per-
son requirement of section 1983211 which translates into the issue of
whether or not money damages may be exacted from political subdi-
visions of the state. This is true for various reasons. Declaratory and
injunctive relief may be obtained through the responsible officials
who are persons acting under color of state law for the purposes of
section 1983. If the responsible officials are found to have acted in
bad faith,216 they may be subject to pay compensatory and punitive
damages out of their own pockets. But they may not be used under
214. For example, an employment discrimination claim may be cognizable under both
Title VII and section 1983. Title VII's administrative prerequisites to filing an action are not
required by section 1983 while section 1983's person requirement is not a limitation under
Title VII.
215. Both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 (1970) use the word "person" in a context analogous
to that of section 1983 so the controversy has practical significance to these statutes as well.
See Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974); Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F.
Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Since several courts have found that the "person" requirement of
section 1983 applies to sections 1981 and 1982 (see Part IV supra) whether suit filed directly
under the Constitution avoids this requirement also may have relevance to these sections.
Many courts, however, have held that the person requirement is not applicable to these
sections thus obviating the necessity of suing directly under the fourteenth amendment in
lieu thereof.
216. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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section 1983 as a conduit to invade the coffers of the govermental
entity itself. Note further that the practical relevance of the contro-
versy is limited to political subdivisions that are not deemed to be
part of the state government wherein a damage remedy in any event
is barred by the eleventh amendment. 217
Another practical consideration is the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement of section 1331(a). There is no such requirement under
section 1343(c), the enabling statute for section 1983, but there is a
$10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement under section 1331(a),
the enabling statute for suit directly under the fourteenth amend-
ment. This seemingly formidable obstacle may not be so in actual-
ity. If all that is sought is declaratory or injunctive relief, this re-
quirement has no actual significance because such relief can be
obtained through the responsible officials under section 1983. More-
over, courts have held that injunctive relief may be valued for the
purpose of determining jurisdictional amount. 2'8 Therefore, coupling
the value of injuctive relief to an otherwise deficient damage claim
may bolster it to meet the jurisdictional amount requirements.t 9
217. See text discussing eleventh amendment, Part II supra. Note that when the eleventh
amendment is deemed to be waived, the state or state agencies may be the subject of the"person" requirement controversy.
218. E.g., Jackson v. American Bar Association, 538 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976); Chavez-
Solido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (civil rights action under fourteenth
amendment); Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (civil rights
action brought under fourteenth amendment).
219. Cf. Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) wherein the Court
stated:
Petitioner's first jurisdictional contention, which we have little difficulty disposing of,
asserts that the $10,000 amount in controversy required by that section is not satisfied
in this case . . . . [T]he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is appar-
ently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really
for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The inability of plaintiff
to recover an amount adequate to give the Court jurisdiction does not show his bad
faith or oust the jurisdiction . . . . We [think] this rule requires disposition of the
jurisdictional question tendered by the petition in favor of the respondent. At the time
Doyle brought this action for reinstatement and $50,000 damages, he had already
accepted a job in a different school system paying approximately $2,000 per year less
than he would have earned with Mt. Healthy Board had he been rehired. The District
Court in fact awarded Doyle compensatory damages in the amount of $5,158 by reason
of income already lost at the time it ordered his reinstatement, it is for only compensa-
tory damages and not reinstatement, it was far from a "legal certainty" at the time of
suit that Doyle would not have been entitled to more than $10,000.
429 U.S. at 276.
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Mount Healthy teaches that the defense of failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted because the defendant is not a"person" within the meaning of section 1983 must be alleged at the
district court level against the section 1983 claim and, to be safe,
against claims under the fourteenth amendment or such defense
may be waived against either claim on appeal. 21 Conversely if sec-
tion 1331 (a) is not alleged as a jurisdictional basis for suit under
the fourteenth amendment at the district court level, it may not
ordinarily be raised for the first time on appeal.221
In short, plaintiff's counsel should allege independently every
plausible constitutional and statutory basis for relief accompanied
by invocation of the appropriate jurisdictional statutes and defense
counsel should likewise allege every comparable defense in his an-
swer and/or motion to dismiss.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to examine the more troublesome non-
substantive considerations affecting the issues of who may be held
liable and what relief may be sought in privately filed federal ac-
tions seeking redress for discrimination under color of state law. The
focus has been on the most often used statutory and constitutional
means of obtaining this end. To be sure, many of the considerations
discussed in this article are in a state of flux; but, amidst the confu-
sion there are some certainties and discernable alternatives that
deserve comment.
Unless the practitioner is expert enough to know for certain that
he may obtain full relief under a particular statute and thus avoid
inundating the cour with unnecessary claims, he should avail him-
self of every plausible jurisdictional and substantive basis for relief
and make every plausible defendant a party sued in both their
individual and official capacities. The present state of the law re-
quires the practitioner to be creative.
The restrictions as to jurisdictional amount, the "person" restric-
220. Id.
221. But see Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1975) which suggests
that the court may be indulgent with inartful pleadings. Obviously, the better approach is
to plead fully and artfully in the complaint.
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tion of §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, the eleventh amendment bar, the Title
VII exhaustion requirements, administrative prerequisites and time
constraints and the various other procedural and jurisdictional bar-
riers to exacting liability and obtaining relief appear to be avoidable
in many instances by use of the right combination of properly
pleaded statutory and constitutional claims. As the content of this
article has illustrated, proper, timely and inclusive pleadings,
whether from plaintiff's or defendant's standpoint, may determine
who and to what extent a party prevails.
Each avenue of relief must be considered in light of its inherent
restrictions, the type of discrimination in issue, the type of defen-
dants sought to be held liable, the nature of relief sought and the
various nonsubstantive matters discussed herein. Of most import-
ance, the effect of these matters upon the issued liability and relief
may vary with the law relied on as well as with the other considera-
tions mentioned in the previous sentence. Moreover, in many in-
stances, the affect is uncertain. Does, for example, the "person"
requirement of section 1983 apply to sections 1981 and 1982 or to
suit directly under the Constitution? Does the Fitzpatrick ruling
extend to suits against the state under sections 1981 and 1982?
Unfortunately, the state of the law is such that whether the pri-
vate plaintiff or defendant acting under color of state law will pre-
vail and the extent of meaningful relief or exoneration, as the case
may be, depends all too much upon intricacies and inconsistencies
in the law, rather than on the merits of the case.
Accepting this fact, lawyers on both sides have an obligation to
educate themselves thoroughly on the nonsubstantive matters that
may determine or substantially affect the course of the suit. As
veteran civil rights practitioners already know, this article has just
scratched the surface. To those newcomers to whom it is mainly
addressed, the bulk of work is ahead.
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